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Abstract
Canada's  relations  with  Nicaragua  changed  greatly  during  the  1980s  after  the  Sandinista  National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in a revolution which overthrew the Somoza dynasty.  For the 
first  few  years  of  the  new  regime  in  Nicaragua,  Canada  provided  little  support,  declaring  that 
Canadians had no significant interests in the country and there was no reason for them to get involved 
in Central America's ongoing conflicts.  When Brian Mulroney first came to power with Joe Clark as 
his Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Progressive Conservatives generally held to the course 
set  by the previous Liberal  government.   However,  as the 1980s went on the Conservatives began 
providing Nicaragua with more bilateral aid, and became increasingly involved in the regional peace 
process known as Esquipulas; this culminated in Canadian peacekeepers entering the region in 1990 as 
part of a UN peacekeeping force.  The major impetus for the government's change in attitude was the 
strong and consistent pressure placed on the government by the Canadian public.  Aid raised privately 
by  Canadians  for  Nicaragua  overshadowed  government  aid  for  much  of  the  decade,  making  the 
government response look weak.  The support of the Canadian public for action in Central America 
was  the  major  factor  which  pressured  the  federal  government  into  becoming  more  involved  in 
Nicaragua, even though the government was not as supportive of the new regime in Nicaragua as a 
large portion of the Canadian public often was.
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Canada's relations with Central America have never been especially prominent.  In terms of 
trade, there has also never been an especially large volume of goods travelling between the two regions. 
In terms of aid, Canada has typically focussed on the old Commonwealth Caribbean and Southeast 
Asia.   In terms of diplomacy,  Canada has tended more towards the Caribbean,  with its  traditional 
British ties.  Canadian companies have not been especially involved in Central America either.  While 
they had reasonably extensive contacts with South America, there have only been a handful who have 
gone to Central America, typically mining companies.1  Canadian church groups were quite active in 
Latin America, but their focus was again on the Caribbean and South America.  While there were 313 
people employed by Canadian diocese of the Catholic Church in Brazil in 1970, 420 in Haiti, and even 
40 in Cuba, there were just 10 in Nicaragua.2  As small as Canada's business and religious ties with 
Nicaragua have been, the federal government has been even less involved.  In the 1940s Canada had a 
most-favoured nation agreement with Nicaragua so that Canadian companies were able to gain the 
same beneficial status as companies from any of Nicaragua's other trading partners, but trade between 
the countries was not large enough for the deal to make much of a difference.3  Canada did not even 
have diplomatic representation in Nicaragua until after the Sandinistas left office.
While Canadian church and labour groups had some limited ties to Nicaragua in the period 
leading up to the Sandinista revolution in 1979, Canada's main ties were through its mining companies, 
who had been involved in the Nicaraguan economy and the country's politics for some time.  Beginning 
in the 1920s, two Canadian companies had a near-monopoly on Nicaraguan gold.  The first, Noranda, 
1 See J.C.M. Ogelsby. Gringos From The Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1866-
1968. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), Chapter 4.
2 Ogelsby, 202.
3 Peter McFarlane. Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1989), 63.
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had been started in  1922 by James Murdoch,  who ran the company from an office in  Rosedale, 
Ontario,  and  had  little  direct  contact  with  his  company's  branch  in  Nicaragua.   The  venture  was 
immensely profitable: he opened his first mine in Nicaragua for $40 000, and within a year it was 
turning a $675 000 yearly profit.4  Adjusted for inflation in 2009, that would be about $8.5 million 
dollars.   Not a  bad profit  for one year  of operation given his  small  initial  investment.   The other 
Canadian mining venture in Nicaragua was started up in 1928 by Thayer Lindsley.  This company was 
then known as Ventures Ltd. and has been more well known in recent years as Falconbridge.  Unlike 
Murdoch, who had little contact with his immensely profitable mine, Lindsley made near-daily phone 
calls to his new operation and frequent visits to assess its progress.  In 1939 Ventures bought the La 
Luz mine, one of Nicaragua's largest.5
The Canadians' efforts in the country were helped by the fact that between 1937 and 1979, it 
was ruled by the powerful Somoza family.  This was typically executed directly by Anastasio Somoza 
García, Luis Somoza Debayle, or Anastasio Somoza Debayle, though on a few occasions the country 
was governed by puppets.  The Somozas were able to maintain their rule through their control over the 
ruthless militia known as the National Guard.  The two Canadian mining companies were both happy 
to take advantage of the protection provided by the National Guard, which required a pay-off; towards 
the end of the Somoza regime, the mining companies were paying hundreds of thousands of dollars per 
year directly to Anastasio Somoza.  In addition to that, they provided military supplies that he used to 
fend off armed insurrection against his family's despotic rule.6  In exchange for their support of the 
Somozas, the mines were able to use the National Guard to keep themselves union free and the profits 
flowing.7  When the Sandinistas came to power, Canadian companies were among their first targets. 






Empressa Minera was taken over and nationalised in the final days of the conflict.8
Previous explanations of Canadian actions in Central America during the time period examined 
here have generally focussed on Canada's role in the international system and have not put much 
emphasis on the role of domestic interest groups, which is one of the main areas which this paper 
focusses on.  Two dominant explanations have emerged, both of which are instructive about at least 
some aspects of Canadian policy in Nicaragua.  The most common explanation has argued that 
Canada's role in the region was generally defined by the Americans; that is to say that Canadian 
governments were acted upon by the U.S. government and dominant American interests and either did 
not have their own interests in the region or were not able to pursue them.  Discussions of Canada's 
foreign affairs policy since World War II have frequently focussed on its purported role as a "middle 
power", a country large enough to wield some influence on the world stage, but not large enough to 
direct major events.  B.J.R. Stevenson argues that Canada actively shunned this role in Central America 
during the 1980s and instead acted quietly, cautiously, and hesitantly out of fear of the U.S.9  He notes 
that Canada's approach to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras - all countries with right-wing 
governments - was the same as that of the U.S.  Only in Nicaragua did the government take a different 
position; Stevenson declares this to be a contradiction.  
His stances on some of the issues in the region are puzzling.  For example, he declares that 
Canada attempted to increase trade with Nicaragua in light of the trade embargo enforced by the 
Reagan government, yet evidence shows that the government did not do this and actually assisted the 
American embargo indirectly.10  He also says that Nicaragua was an example of the challenges to U.S. 
dominance which were occurring in the 1980s, and that the emergence of new regional arrangements in 
the 1980s reduced the importance of the United Nations.11  A more likely explanation for the decrease 
8 McFarlane, 161.
9 Stevenson, 9.
10 Stevenson, 8.  This issue will be addressed in more detail in the chapter on Canadian-American relations.
11 Stevenson, 4.
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in the importance of the U.N. is put forward by Tom Keating, who argues that the Reagan 
administration used its power to actively sabotage the ability of the U.N. to operate.  Keating quotes 
former Canadian diplomat John Holmes, who declared that U.S. actions in Nicaragua, Grenada, and 
Libya in the 1980s were running the danger of causing irreversible damage to the U.N. system.12  This 
is evidence of the fact that the U.S. did not have diminished power: it could single-handedly disrupt 
attempts by the international community to resolve conflicts.
Keating discusses Canada's role in the region as part of a long-standing process in Canada's 
foreign policy of using multilateral institutions to increase its influence and prestige.  According to 
Keating, since the 1940s Canada has actively supported a wide range of multilateral institutions, and 
has done so not merely out of concern for the way that the international community was organised, but 
also out of a "conscious interest in the substantive content of the international order".13  He describes 
multilateralism as being a tool for protecting the interests of middle-power nations such as Canada.14  A 
number of people within the Canadian government put forward that view in the 1980s.  Joe Clark 
declared that "no other major power has Canada's institutional reach",15 while Brian Mulroney saw it as 
such a priority that he identified that revitalization of multilateral institutions as a pressing foreign 
policy objective in the 1984 Speech From the Throne.16  Keating's explanation is accurate in at least 
one respect - Canada's insistence on finding regional, mutually negotiated solutions to the conflicts in 
Central America reflect this world view.  At the same time, Canada's actions did not represent a 
"conscious interest in the substantive content of the international order" (emphasis added).  As this 
paper will show, Canadian actions and statements very rarely carried with them any tangible, physical 
actions.  Instead, they were very much directed out of a concern about how the international 
12 Tom Keating. Canada and World Order: The Multilateral Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. (Don Mills, ON: 






community was organised, contrary to what Keating argues.
The Sandinista Years
The Somoza regime was overthrown in July 1979, when the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) took over Managua, its last remaining stronghold.  At the time, the FSLN was composed 
of a broad coalition that included orthodox Marxists, those advocating for a mixed economy, members 
of the business community such as Violetta Chamorro, and church leaders.  Before long it was clear 
that it was those who advocated for a mixed economy, led by Daniel Ortega, who would have most of 
the power in the new government, and eventually a number of prominent members of the group, such 
as Chamorro, would leave to oppose the Sandinistas.  The U.S. was unhappy with the result, not 
wanting the Sandinistas in power.  They would fund an insurrection against the government (staged 
primarily from Honduras), until 1990, when the pro-Western candidate Chamorro came to power.
Canada did not respond to the revolution with violence, and initially neither did the U.S. 
Canada - led at the time by Joe Clark's Progressive Conservatives - recognised the Sandinistas as being 
the legitimate governing party of Nicaragua within days of their taking Managua.  The U.S., led at the 
time by Democratic President Jimmy Carter, also recognised them quickly.  Shortly after this, Clark 
was defeated in an election by Pierre Trudeau's Liberals, who also recognised the legitimacy of the 
Sandinistas.  But aside from recognising that they were the legitimate governing party of Nicaragua, 
the Liberals were not especially active in response to the revolution.  Virtually no aid was provided to 
Nicaragua in the first years of FSLN rule, though towards the end of Trudeau's time in office Canada 
did provide a fairly significant amount of food aid, and a large line of credit was extended to Nicaragua 
in 1983 for the purpose of increasing their dairy capabilities.  The Liberals were not very active 
diplomatically either.  They put virtually no pressure on the United States to stop destabilising the 
region, except to express displeasure that they had not been notified about the invasion of Grenada 
before it was launched in 1983.  If anything, Trudeau's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark 
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MacGuigan, seemed to be at least nominally supportive of the U.S.  He repeated the American line as 
Canada's own in the House of Commons on multiple occasions, and frequently said that he trusted the 
U.S.  Toward the end of Trudeau's final term, Allan MacEachen replaced MacGuigan as Secretary of 
State for External Affairs and he set a more moderate tone, one which was largely mirrored by his 
Progressive Conservative successor, Joe Clark, who took over the position following the victory of 
Brian Mulroney.  On the whole, the Liberal response to Nicaragua and its revolution was that Canada 
had no substantial interests in Central America, nor any particular reason to get involved in the region's 
disputes.  The Liberals only real involvement in the country was in the food aid that was provided 
toward the end of their time in office.
It would be useful here to clarify the term "interests", which will be used many times 
throughout this thesis.  The Liberals and Progressive Conservatives often used terms such as "Canadian 
interests" while American politicians also referred to "American interests".  The terms are not 
especially accurate, however.  What was seen as being in the Canadian interest had little to do with any 
benefit for the average Canadian citizen.  What was typically meant was the interests of Canadian 
business or finance.  Occasionally it also meant Canada's image on the world stage, or its influence in 
multilateral organisations.  When MacGuigan claimed that Canada had no interests in Nicaragua, he 
was clearly mistaken.  Canadians were immensely concerned with the troubles in the region, and 
especially in Nicaragua.  Canadian churches were involved in development in Nicaragua, as were 
Canadian unions, before the revolution occurred.  Afterward, private Canadian citizens, primarily 
through non-governmental organisation (NGO) campaigns, became heavily involved in development 
efforts in the region, both by donating money and by working directly in Nicaragua.  The same was at 
least somewhat true in the U.S., where there was also a large protest movement against American 
actions in the region united under the slogan "No more Vietnams."17
17 B.J.R. Stevenson. Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1990. 
(Ottawa: Queens University Press, 2000), 18.
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When the Progressive Conservatives first came to power, their tactics toward the Sandinistas 
were quite similar to those of the Liberals.  While the Tories were expected to take a hard-line position 
more similar to that of the Americans, leader Brian Mulroney surprised many people when Joe Clark, 
known for being more moderate than some of his colleagues, was named Secretary of State for 
External Affairs and ordered a review of Canada's policies towards Central America in response to the 
immense public interest in the issue.  The Conservatives ended the Liberal strategy of providing 
significant food aid to Nicaragua, and initially provided the country with money primarily through 
loans.  Later in the decade, once the Tories had completed a review of Canada's foreign aid strategy,18 
Nicaragua then became a fairly significant recipient of official development assistance (ODA), as it 
saw the amount of aid provided by Canada jump by approximately nine times in just one year.  The 
Progressive Conservatives also took part in both the Contadora and Esquipulas negotiations which 
sought to bring peace to Central America - negotiations which the United States opposed from the 
outset.  However, like the Liberals, the Tories were careful not to stray too far from the American line. 
While it was clearly in the interests of both Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney to appear as though 
they supported a strong, independent foreign policy for Canada - and both made sure to tell people they 
thought that was exactly what they were doing - Canadian policy was still constrained by that of the 
U.S.  However, the Conservatives were more involved Nicaragua than the Liberals had been on two 
important fronts: they provided more aid in the last few years of the decade, and they were more 
involved in the peace negotiations.
Unlike the federal government, the Canadian public was both vocal and active in regard to 
Nicaragua.  In the early aftermath of the revolution in Nicaragua, Canadian labour leaders were among 
the first to meet with the new Nicaraguan leadership (they were in the region for an unrelated 
conference at the time).  Private aid, especially from the Canadian Labour Congress, reached hundreds 
18 Canadian International Development Agency.  Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance. 
Hull, Quebec: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987.
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of thousands of dollars very quickly afterward, easily overshadowing the government's general 
inaction.  Over the next several years, there were several times when the amount of annual private aid 
raised for Nicaragua was greater than that donated by the government, though by the last few years of 
FSLN rule, the federal government was providing a good deal more than was being raised by NGOs. 
Canadians started letter writing campaigns, petitions, and participated in other forms of awareness 
raising to help out the people of Nicaragua.  The crises in Central America, where Nicaragua was front 
and centre, were among the most common issues that Canadians wrote to their Ministers of Parliament 
(MPs) about.  Parliamentary committees dealing with the issue were surprised to received such a large 
amount of communication about Canada's role in Central America.19
What is most interesting about the public support for Nicaraguans is that it was so varied and 
consistent.  Unions took centre stage at times, but many other campaigns were run and supported by 
ordinary Canadians.  The NGO which raised the greatest amount of donations for Nicaragua, Tools For 
Peace, was started by a group of fishers in British Columbia (B.C.), before expanding across the 
country.  Aid for Nicaragua came from every region of the country and all classes.  While newspapers 
reported that support for the Sandinistas was greatest among the middle class and the university 
educated,20 NGOs countered that the bulk of their money came from the lower class.21  Across 
employment, region, education, and income level, Canadians from all aspects of society were willing to 
give to Nicaragua.  The government had no choice but to respond in the face of such overwhelming 
public support.
Canada's role in Nicaragua throughout the 1980s was somewhat consistent across the activities 
of both Liberal and Progressive Conservative (PC) governments.  Neither took entirely the same stance 
as the Reagan administration, but both were concerned about differing from it too forcefully.  The 
19 "On Nicaragua: It's Time To Speak Out", Toronto Star (July 26, 1986), B2.
20 "Majority Oppose Greater U.S. Role In Latin America", Globe and Mail.
21 "Canadian Aid The Best Approach", Toronto Star (January 13, 1986), C1.
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Liberals were nominally supportive of the Sandinistas, but just as frequently criticised them and 
provided no real support beyond a year or two of food aid.  They seemed to be in agreement with the 
U.S. on everything except the use of force.  The Tories had a more difficult time of it as there were 
clear divisions within their party over how closely to mirror the American position.  In the end, they 
were more supportive of Nicaragua than the Liberals had been, but only when doing so did not risk 
seriously offending the Americans.  They provided more aid than the Liberals and were more involved 
in the peace process, largely at the request of Mexico.  Clark and Mulroney both saw Central America 
as a region where they could demonstrate their independence to Canadians.  Like the Liberals, they 
were extremely cautious about doing anything which might upset the Reagan administration, even 
when it seemed as though taking a more forceful stand could have positively influenced the chances for 
peace in the region.  The one factor which was consistent with both governments, however, was the 
support for the new regime in Nicaragua amongst the Canadian people.  No matter how inclined they 
may have been towards the American position at times, both Liberal and Tory governments had little 




The Public and NGO Response
Much of what has been written about Canada's relationship with Central America during the 
1980s treats public engagement as an afterthought.  The main focus is typically on Canada's role in the 
Contadora and Esquipulas peace negotiations.  However, Canada's main engagement with Nicaragua 
during  this  period  was  not  government-to-government,  but  people-to-people.   Canada's  oldest 
connections  were  business  ties,  primarily  through its  mining  companies.   Religious  and  other  aid 
groups from Canada were also involved in Nicaragua long before the federal government decided to 
play a role in the region,  though their  impact does not stretch back as far  or as deeply as that  of 
Canada's mining companies.  Stevenson links the involvement of Canadian church, labour, and NGO 
groups  in  Latin  America  with  the  overthrow  of  Salvador  Allende  in  Chile  in  September  1973. 
According to Stevenson, it was outrage over this action that got Canadians interested in social justice in 
the region.22  Perhaps the clearest evidence of the involvement of the Canadian public in Nicaragua was 
the  fact  that  the  main  reason  the  federal  government  became  involved  at  all  was  due  to  public 
pressure.23  It  demanded government get involved directly,  through its  letter  writing,  petitions,  and 
responses to  public  opinion polls;  they also pressured the government  indirectly because the huge 
amount of aid that Canadians privately donated to Nicaragua made the government's response look 
weak at times.  It is for this reason that this thesis begins by examining the public response to the 
Sandinista regime; the public response directed and framed virtually every other aspect of Canada's 
relationship with the region during this period.24
22 Stevenson, 6.
23 According to Joe Clark, public opinion polling by the Progressive Conservatives after they came to power in 1984 
determined that Central America was an area that many Canadians wanted their government to take an active interest in, 
and that was one of the main reasons that the party became involved in the region to the degree that it did.  Interview 
with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
24 There were, of course, other factors, which will be dealt with in the following chapters, but the public response was the 
most important.
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Action on the Ground: The Church and NGO Response
The  initial  Canadian  response  to  the  revolution  in  Nicaragua  came  not  from  the  federal 
government, but from Canada's unions.  In the immediate aftermath of the civil war in 1979, the Clark 
government  pledged  the  paltry  sum  of  $180,000  worth  of  aid.   However,  the  Canadian  Labour 
Congress had by that point already collected $250,000 worth of donations, making the government's 
response look weak.25  The Tories came under fire for this from both the public and the House of 
Commons.   On October 16,  1979, three months after  the Sandinistas had come to power,  Pauline 
Jewett, the New Democratic Party foreign affairs critic, lashed out at the Clark government for failing 
to provide for a country which had recently undergone a democratic revolution after a bloody civil war. 
She wanted to know why the government had, as of that point, not provided any aid to the people of 
Nicaragua,  while  the  Canadian  public  had  already  raised  $400,000,  primarily  through  the  labour 
movement.  The only government contribution at that point, was the planes which they had used to 
deliver the privately raised aid.26  Further, the Tories were attacked by the NDP during the rest of their 
short  term  in  office  for  ignoring  the  needs  of  Nicaraguan  refugees,27 and  for  refusing  to  make 
Nicaragua a country eligible for bilateral aid through the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA).28
Unlike the government,  however,  some sectors of the Canadian public were quick to react. 
Canada's unions quickly raised hundreds of thousands of dollars from their members to donate to a 
country where the interests of the working class were seen as triumphant.  One would expect Canada's 
unions to be supportive of a revolution from a coalition that had made goals such as land reform and 
workers' rights a prominent part of its agenda.  What is more surprising was how quickly Canadians 
25 McFarlane, 162, 164.
26 Pauline Jewett. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (October 12, 1979), 141.
27 Margaret Mead. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (October 16, 1979), 283.
28 Bob Ogle. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (November 1, 1979), 832.
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from a wide variety of backgrounds came together to show their support for the democratic revolution 
of Nicaragua.  By 1981, Canadians were well aware of what was occurring in Nicaragua, and several 
non-labour groups had started collecting donations.  Canada's churches, too, quickly became involved 
in the region, and members travelled to Nicaragua, returning with information that helped inform and 
shape public opinion.29
By  1981,  in  the  non-governmental  sector  a  variety  of  projects  were  beginning  to  build 
momentum.  An organisation known as Tools For Peace was started up in British Colombia in 1981.  It 
was originally made up of a group of Canadian fishers who decided they wanted to help out their 
counterparts in Nicaragua.  That year, they donated $25,000 in fishing equipment to Nicaragua.30  This 
campaign formed the template under which much of the private Canadian aid would be raised and 
donated to Nicaragua throughout the remainder of the decade, and Tools For Peace became the most 
successful of Nicaraguan fund raisers.  Like many grass-roots efforts, the campaign was not raising 
money for a government, but for a particular group of people.  The fishers simply saw an opportunity to 
help  out  people  who they  saw as  being  somewhat  similar  to  themselves,  even  though  they lived 
thousands of miles apart.  
The other way in which this campaign helped to establish the precedent for fundraising efforts 
later in the decade is that Tools For Peace did not collect money, but goods.  This was important, 
because it meant that the people organising and the people donating both had to be at least somewhat 
familiar with the situation in Nicaragua.  They needed to know what had happened in Nicaragua, what 
was currently happening, and what kinds of materials would actually be of use to its people.  One of the 
things  that  Nicaragua needed at  this  time was food, so what  better  way to help them out then by 
providing materials to make it easier for them to feed themselves?  It not only raised awareness of the 
29 Canada, House of Commons Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. 
Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981-82), 8:11.
30 "Canadian Group Boosts Sandinistas", Toronto Star (March 18, 1986), A17.
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fact that Nicaragua needed aid, but that a specific set of conditions required a specific type of aid.
Tools  For  Peace  was  not  the  only group in  Canada  raising  money for  Nicaragua.   British 
Columbia was once again the leader when it came to Oxfam Canada's ability to raise money to help. 
Toward the end of 1981, Oxfam Canada's British Columbia chapter sent $70,000 in aid to Nicaraguans. 
Again, this amount may seem small, especially in light of the fact that the federal government had 
provided more than twice as much bilateral aid that year, but it is worth emphasising that the amount of 
money that Oxfam had raised just for the Nicaraguan cause in 1981 was greater than the amount of 
money that the organisation had raised for all causes combined during the previous year.31  British 
Columbians had clearly become quite interested about what was going on in Central America.
Public interest and concern about the region continued to rise during the following year as well. 
Canadians wanted to help out Nicaraguans and they also wanted the United States to stop meddling in 
the region.  In the spring of 1982, Pauline Jewett introduced a petition into Parliament on behalf of a 
newly formed Canadian  advocacy group which  called  itself  Canadian  Action  for  Nicaragua.   The 
organisation had collected 5,000 signatures condemning any outside threats against the sovereignty of 
Nicaragua,32 implicitly meant to indicate disapproval for American activities in the area.  Many other 
petitions on the issue were presented in the House of Commons over the next few years, such as one 
from Saskatoon requesting that the Liberal  government publicly condemn the United States for its 
interference in Nicaragua, something the government refused to do,33  another came from residents of 
Ontario asking the Liberals to make a request to American officials for them to stop their activities in 
Nicaragua.34  A  third  originated  in  Hamilton  which  requested  that  the  government  formally 
communicate to the United States that Canada would condemn any invasion of Nicaragua as well as El 
31 "Ship Leaving Vancouver Today Oxfam Defies U.S. Sends Nicaragua Aid", Globe and Mail (December 8, 1982), P1.
32 Pauline Jewett. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (April 27, 1982), 16654.
33 Bob Ogle. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (February 28, 1983), 23282.
34 Dan Heap. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (June 22, 1983), 26672.
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Salvador, which remained a serious concern throughout the 1980s.35  Of interest is the fact that the 
petition expressing concern over a potential  invasion of Nicaragua was presented by a Member of 
Parliament representing the government of the day, Stanley Hudecki; Hudecki would later take part in 
Parliamentary committees under the Progressive Conservative government which examined the Central 
American crisis in more detail.
Another petition from the city of Saskatoon was introduced in February 1983 by a Progressive 
Conservative MP, this one expressing concern that the people of Nicaragua were potentially being 
harmed by the FSLN government; most of the other petitions were presented by NDP MPs who wanted 
the government to show more support for the Sandinistas.36  One problem with these petitions is that it 
is rarely clear how widely they were circulated, or how many Canadians actually supported them, since 
the Parliamentary record does not indicate how many signatures many of them had.  Petitions were 
presented on behalf of many different regions in Canada, however, so interest was not limited to one 
particular part of the country.
Churches and other religious organisations within Canada were also very active at this time both 
within Nicaragua and at home trying to raise awareness about the needs of the people of Nicaragua. 
Given the strength of the Liberation Theology movement in Central America around this time and the 
heavy involvement of some elements of the Catholic Church within Central American political culture, 
this should not be surprising.37  There had long been a strong element of a similar movement within 
Protestant churches known as the Social Gospel, and a number of its followers were members of the 
35 Stanley Hudecki. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (November 15, 1983), 28895.  Other similar petitions were 
presented in front of the House of Commons on numerous occasions over the following years, these few were simply 
chosen as demonstrative examples.
36 Gus Mitges. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (February 23, 1983), 23143.
37 Liberation Theology is a movement in the Catholic Church which was at its peak around this time.  Its practitioners 
argued that Christian doctrine required that followers of God be willing to fight for the social reforms necessary to 
improve the plight of the poor and that they should not stay out of national politics.  It is perhaps most commonly 
associated with Salvadoran Bishop Oscar Romero, who was assassinated during Mass by a right wing paramilitary 
associated with the U.S. Army's School of the Americas.  See H. Mark Roelofs, "Liberation Theology: The Recovery of 
Biblical Radicalism", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (1988), 549-566.
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New Democratic Party.  This included then-sitting MP Bob Ogle, who was one of the most frequent 
and vocal critics of Canada's policy towards Nicaragua.
Canadian church groups had been operating within Nicaragua before the federal government 
had any real idea what was going on in the country, and religious groups helped to inform Parliament 
about the situation on the ground.  Andre Vallée, Secretary General of the Canadian Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, returned from Nicaragua in 1982 to tell a Parliamentary sub-committee what he had 
witnessed.   With reports  coming out of the U.S.  indicating that  Nicaragua was charting a  Marxist 
course of development and was trying to export its revolution to the rest of the region, Vallée told the 
sub-committee that while, the new government in Nicaragua was not capitalist, neither was it socialist. 
Rather, the country was being rebuilt by its own people, the poor majority, for their own benefit.38
Vallée had just returned from an eleven day trip to Nicaragua, where he had met with both 
church  and  political  leaders.   Nicaraguan  leaders  showed  a  surprising  willingness  to  meet  with 
Canadians from a variety of backgrounds during this period; the Sandinistas met with labour officials 
almost immediately after they came to power (there was a labour conference in the region at the time), 
they met with church groups such as the delegation that Vallée had gone with,  and they met with 
Canadian politicians.  The new government had much to do to repair a country torn apart by civil war 
and years of exploitation, but the Sandinstas also felt it was important to elicit support internationally, 
especially given the aggressive stance toward the new regime shown by the United States.
Vallée informed the government that, contrary to reports they may have heard, Nicaragua had a 
relatively free press, and allowed free association of political parties.39  The view provided by the head 
of the Conference of Catholic Bishops contradicted the one given to the sub-committee by Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, who had previously suggested that, while the Sandinistas 
38 House of Commons Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 8:11.
39 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 8:11.
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were an improvement over the Somozas, they were still moving the country in the wrong direction.40 
The federal  government  (and parts  of  the civil  service,  as will  be demonstrated in  the chapter  on 
development assistance, wanted a liberal, centrist government which would be sympathetic to Western 
economic perspectives, so to them a government which nationalised major industries was a move in the 
"wrong"  direction.   While  the  churches  were  primarily  pressuring  the  government  to  support  the 
Nicaraguan people rather than the Sandinista government, they did also favour some of the FSLN's 
policies; for example, Vallée complained that private firms in Nicaragua would pay the lowest wages 
they were legally allowed to, and were criticising the government because they did not like unions 
being set up where the National Guard had previously prevented them from existing.41  
Private aid grew quickly and considerably after 1981.  In 1982, Tools For Peace raised $150, 
000 - six times the total they had raised in their initial year of operation.  By 1983, they were raising $1 
million a year.42  Discussion around aid, particularly aid donated to NGOs, often centres around the 
question of how much aid actually reaches the people it is intended to help.  How much money is spent 
on administration and salaries?  How much money is taken by "corruption" in the recipient country?  In 
this case, the answer is obvious - all $1 million in aid went to the people who needed it.  Tools For 
Peace did not send money, but goods, and they were sent directly to the people who were intended to 
use them.  All the work needed for the campaign was carried out by volunteers.  The Tools For Peace 
campaign also helps to illustrate the fact that the effort was contributed to by people across Canada, and 
why  there  was  no  need  for  large  administrative  fees.   Canadian  freight  companies  donated 
transportation to Vancouver for goods that had been collected across the country, while longshoremen 
in British Columbia loaded the containers for free.43  
A wide variety of Canadians contributed to the cause, and did so in many different ways.  Some 
40 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 1:34..
41 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 8:12.
42 "Private Aid Sails to Nicaragua Today", Globe and Mail (December 12, 1983), P3.
43 "Private Aid Sails to Nicaragua Today", Globe and Mail (December 12, 1983), P3.
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purchased  goods;  some  volunteered  at  local  Tools  For  Peace  branches  by  raising  awareness  and 
organising the donations; some donated resources, such as trucks; some donated the work necessary to 
ensure the goods were shipped.  People will often say that they support a cause, but that does not 
necessarily mean that they will go to the effort of actually seeing it through.  The Nicaraguan cause, 
however, brought a wide segment of the Canadian population to action in order to help out people 
living thousands of kilometres away.  It was not merely students, activists, or other people who could 
be dismissed as being on the "fringe"; a large number of Canadians from a variety of backgrounds and 
circumstances donated in a wide variety of ways to the cause of development in Nicaragua.  With such 
a  broad cross-section of  the  Canadian public  getting  involved in  ways  that  were very visible  and 
seemed to cut across any clear partisan lines, the federal government was left with little choice but to 
get involved as well.
What was the overall  public perception of the situation in Central  America?  Opinion polls 
taken in 1984 give us some idea.  Liisa North reports that one Gallup poll from the summer of 1984 
revealed that two-thirds of Canadians  opposed U.S.  policy in Central  America.44  However,  a poll 
discussed in the Globe and Mail in the fall of that year was a bit more ambiguous.  There, only half of 
respondents  said they were opposed to  a wider  role  for the U.S.  military in  the region,  while  the 
remaining respondents were more or less split on whether or not they would favour it or were unsure. 
The results of the poll were highly skewed by class: only 35 percent of those with less than a university 
education were against an expansion of the U.S. military in the region, while nearly twice as many 
people with university degrees (65 percent) were against such an expansion.  Even simply having an 
opinion was an indicator of class, as far fewer of the people who did not possess a university degree 
were able to give a definite answer, an indication that awareness of the issue seemed to be much more 
44 Liisa North, ed. Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990), 
51.  
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common among the middle and upper class.45  That result is interesting in light of the fact that much of 
the work done in the campaigns to raise money for Nicaragua was done by people in occupations more 
traditionally associated with the working class - fishers, truck drivers, dock workers, factory workers, 
and people in other similar positions.  
Perhaps the most interesting thing about these two polls is that they closely mirrored public 
opinion in the U.S.  In May 1983 the Washington Post reported on a poll which revealed that 63% of 
Americans believed that the U.S. should never consider overthrowing a Latin American government, 
while  24% said  that  it  would  be  acceptable  to  do  so.46  The  questions  asked  of  Canadians  and 
Americans  were  a  bit  different  (Americans  were  asked  explicitly  about  regime  change,  while 
Canadians were not), but they both showed that approximately two-thirds of their citizens were against 
military action in  the region.   B.J.R. Stevenson has argued that  American NGOs and civil  society 
groups had much more power in the U.S. than in Canada during this time.47  However, in the case of 
Nicaragua, the opposite was true.  Campaigning on behalf of Nicaragua may have had some effect on 
American Congressional voting, as Congress was not as consistently supportive of the Contras as the 
Reagan administration was, but this campaigning had virtually no effect on foreign policy.  On the 
other hand, consistent public pressure in Canada did help guide public policy.
A poll taken for the  Toronto Star about a year later also showed the public generally, but not 
overwhelmingly, against American policy in the region.  In that poll, 56 percent of those polled blamed 
the unrest in Central America on poverty and injustice, which was the position held by the Mulroney 
government as well.  Yet 28 percent said that the Soviet Union and Cuba were the leading cause of the 
problem, and only 12 percent said that the U.S. was the main culprit.48  At first glance, this appears to 
45 "Majority Oppose Greater U.S. Role In Latin America", Globe and Mail.
46 R.A. Pastor. Not Condemned To Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 
295.
47 Stevenson, 19.
48 "82 percent Want Canada Neutral on Middle East", Toronto Star (November 12, 1984), A4.
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indicate that Canadians were more than twice as likely to blame the Soviet Union than they were to 
blame the U.S., an apparent reversal of other polls showing that Canadians disagreed with U.S. policy 
in the region.  A more likely explanation, however, is that those who believed the United States was a 
destabilising force in the region also thought that poverty was a major cause of the unrest.  That was, 
for example, the view espoused by many Canadian church groups.49  Those who blamed the Soviet 
Union were unlikely to be sympathetic with issues like workers' rights, land reform, and nationalisation 
of industry, so it is fair to say that in fact far more Canadians opposed the U.S. role in the region than 
supported it.  
Another figure from the same  Star survey seems to contradict the  Globe's finding that many 
Canadians were unsure about Central American policy: 80 percent of those surveyed said that Canada 
should be concerned about what was occurring in Central America.50  This seems to be the only poll 
concerned specifically with  how Canadians  viewed  Canada's role  in  the region.   All  of  the  other 
questions  referred  specifically  to  U.S.  policy  in  the  region,  and  how  Canadians  felt  about  that. 
Unfortunately, the press and pollsters seemed to be fixated on what the U.S. was doing and not what 
Canada could be doing.  In the mainstream press, the attitude seemed to be that Canada's role in the 
region could be nothing but a response to the United States.  Canadian aid groups acted differently, 
though.  They were simply trying to help out people who had undergone a democratic revolution after 
decades of despotism.
While responding to the U.S. was not the goal of most Canadian aid efforts, it was impossible 
for aid groups not to respond in some way.  Indeed, the Somoza regime had been propped up by the 
U.S. for many years.  By the mid-1980s, U.S. policy was beginning to affect Canadian aid in a much 
more  noticeable  way -  the mining of  Nicaraguan harbours  carried out  by the U.S.  was  making it 
difficult and dangerous for aid to get to its target.  The United States had decided to place underwater 
49 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 2:7.
50 "82 percent Want Canada Neutral on Middle East", Toronto Star (November 12, 1984), A4.
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mines in Nicaraguan water due to what they claimed were threats to American national security posed 
by the Sandinista regime.  Ostensibly the mines were intended to prevent Soviet or Cuban military aid 
from reaching Nicaragua; however, mines are not able to pick out ships based on nationality or cargo. 
The end result was that the U.S. was indiscriminately targeting all ocean-bound shipping into or out of 
Nicaragua regardless of origin or purpose. 
And the mines did indeed affect the delivery of private Canadian aid which was intended for the 
people - not the government - of Nicaragua.  When Mark MacGuigan was asked about the mining of 
Nicaraguan harbours, he was uncharacteristically critical of the American government, declaring in no 
uncertain terms that Canada considered it to be an illegal action.  Nevertheless, he declared that the 
mining was not impeding the delivery of Canadian aid.51  This would have been news to many of 
Canada's aid groups, who were in fact having difficulty delivering aid because of the illegal American 
action.  
The United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, B.C.'s largest fishermen's organisation, built a 
boat to send to Nicaraguan fishers.  They had originally planned to buy materials and ship them to 
Nicaragua so that the boat could be built there, but they were unable to find a freighter company which 
would  be  willing  to  ship  the  materials  through  Nicaragua's  mine-infested  waters.   They were  not 
entirely certain how they were going to get the boat to Nicaragua once they had finished building it in 
B.C. either.52  The problems facing organisations shipping to Nicaragua were brought to the attention of 
Parliament a few years later by Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy, who apparently did not think it was a big 
enough issue to raise in Parliament when his own party was in power.  Axworthy told the House of 
Commons that Farmers For Peace were encountering great difficulty in getting aid to Nicaragua on 
account of the mined harbours.  In order to get their goods to the people of Nicaragua, they had to send 
ships south, past Nicaragua, and into Costa Rica, where they could safely reach harbour.  After that, the 
51 "MacEachen's Harder Line On Nicaragua", Globe and Mail (May 2, 1984), P7.
52 "Building A Boat To Help Fishermen" Toronto Star (December 27, 1986), B5.
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goods were shipped along the roads from Costa Rica into Nicaragua, requiring more time, money, and 
manpower than would have otherwise been necessary.53
Despite the difficulties, Canadians continued to donate in large volumes.  In 1985, Tools For 
Peace  raised  $1.5  million  for  Nicaraguans,  about  50  percent  more  than  the  federal  government's 
bilateral aid program to Nicaragua for the 1985-86 fiscal year.54  As was the case with Tools For Peace 
in previous years, it was goods and not money that had been raised.  For that year's efforts, the primary 
focus was on Nicaragua's remarkable literacy campaign which had drastically increased the literacy 
rate in just a few short years.  Items sent included pencils, paper, notebooks, and typewriters.  The aid 
was not only practical, but also symbolic; to that end, electrical supplies, batteries, and candles were 
donated for a campaign intended to represent "the hope that sustains Nicaraguans in their struggle for 
independence."  In addition, 10,000 blankets were donated to help out some of the families who had 
been forced from their homes as the result of paramilitary attacks.  It was estimated that there were 
about 300,000 displaced people within Nicaragua at the time as a result of the ongoing aggression of 
the Contras.  Contradicting the  Globe's poll results, which reported that people with less education 
were more likely to be in favour of American actions in the region, a Tools For Peace co-ordinator told 
the  Toronto Star  that there had "been a massive willingness and openness, especially on the part of 
lower-income people" to provide anything they had available to the cause,  whether it  was time or 
goods.55  While the middle-class may have been more likely to say they were supportive of the changes 
in Nicaragua, the lower-class was more likely to get physically involved in efforts to support them.
The scale  of  this  campaign should not  be underestimated.   Combined private  aid  from the 
United States,  Canada,  Europe,  and Japan for Nicaragua totalled about  $5 million per  year at  this 
53 Lloyd Axworthy. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (December 2, 1987), 11414.  Goods had to be shipped south 
into Costa Rica due to the presence of the Contras along Nicaragua's northern border with Honduras.
54 CIDA, Annual Report 1985-86, 79.
55 "Canadian Aid The Best Approach", Toronto Star (January 13, 1986), C1.
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time.56  Tools For Peace was by the middle of the 1980s raising approximately one-third of the total 
private aid provided to Nicaragua from the industrialised world.  In 1986, $3.5 million worth of aid for 
Nicaragua was raised by Canadian NGOs,57 three and a half times the amount of bilateral aid given to 
Nicaragua by the federal government!58  It was the citizens of Canada, not the federal government, who 
were providing the bulk of aid heading to Nicaragua from Canada.59  In the face of such strong public 
support for development in Central America, the government was forced to take a more active role, as 
it did in the latter part of the decade.60
Mined harbours were not the only difficulty facing Canadians trying to help out in Nicaragua. 
The Contras were also involved in the destruction of several Canadian aid projects, and the killing of a 
Canadian priest.  The first of these attacks occurred at the beginning of August in 1986.  Canadians 
with  a  group  calling  themselves  the  Louis  Riel  Brigade  volunteered  in  a  small  village  in  rural 
Nicaragua, where they helped to build a school and some houses, in support of the Sandinista literacy 
campaign.  The day after the Canadians involved in the effort left the village to return home, Contras 
attacked it, destroying much of what the Canadians had helped to build.  Even more devastating to the 
people who had volunteered, and to the people who lived there, five villagers were killed and 26 were 
injured during the attack.61
Another attack occurred the next summer, on a village that another Canadian aid group, Farmers 
For Peace, had helped rebuild.  Farmers For Peace had purchased $118,965 worth of farm equipment 
for the village of Macotal and $86,522 had been provided to the village by CIDA.62  The issue was 
raised in Parliament, where it was revealed that this was the second time that this village had been 
56 "Canadian Group Boosts Sandinistas", Toronto Star (March 18, 1986), A17.
57 "Canadians Go To The Rescue Of Embattled Nicaragua", Toronto Star (November 15, 1986), B5.
58 CIDA, Annual Report 1985-86, 79 and 1986-87, 103.
59 CIDA did have a program where they would match donations provided to NGOs; in 1986-87 they gave NGOs $1.63 
million in funding through this program, bringing the government's total funding level closer to the amount raised 
privately, though it was still about one million dollars less.  CIDA, Annual Report 1986-87, 137.
60 The level of government aid will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 3.
61 "Canadian Aid Believed Cause of Contra Raid", Toronto Star (August 3, 1986), A19.
62 "Canada Protests Contra Attack On Aid Project", Toronto Star (June 2, 1987), A9.
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attacked after Canadians had helped to rebuild it.  Given that the Contras, who carried out the attack, 
were funded almost entirely by the United States, Joe Clark was asked by an opposition MP if Canada 
was prepared to use the United Nations as a forum to condemn the act as terrorism, provide money to 
rebuild the village out of CIDA funds, and ask the United States to pressure the Contras to release four 
villagers who had been kidnapped in the raid.  Clark responded that he would consider the last two out 
of the three suggestions, but that he was not willing to condemn the act as terrorism.63  In October of 
that year, the same aid project was attacked yet again, but even after having been rebuilt and raided 
multiple times, the government still refused to issue any sort of public statement about the attacks.64 
This was consistent with Canada's Central American policy under both the Liberals and Conservatives. 
The government would announce to Parliament that  it  was going to let its views be known to the 
United States in private meetings, but would not make any sort of public declaration about the issue; 
they certainly would not publicly criticise the U.S.65  Circumstances may have made it seem as though 
a public protest in this instance would have been futile.  Just a few months earlier, an official in the 
State Department had told Canadian media that Canada should cut off its aid to farms in Nicaragua, 
because those farms were being used as military bases.66  This certainly would have been news to the 
Louis Riel Brigade, who had gone to Nicaragua to build a school  But, as will be explained in the next 
chapter, the federal government likely had more influence with the U.S. than it was willing to admit.
Two Canadians were killed as a result of the Contra war in the 1980s, one by the Contras, and 
one by the Sandinistas.  In March 1986, Reverend William Arsenault of Bonaventure, Quebec was 
killed by Contra guerillas while working in a training centre in Honduras, where the Contras were 
operating.  He was beaten and shot to death while helping to build a house for physically and mentally 
63 Joe Clark. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (June 4, 1987), 6730.
64 Canada, House of Commons Debates, (October 13, 1987), 9912.
65 This issue will be dealt with in much more detail in the next chapter.
66 "U.S. Official Attacks Canada's Foreign Aid 'Shoring Up' Nicaragua", Toronto Star (January 7, 1987), A14.
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handicapped  children.67  While  no  Canadian  aid  workers  had  been  killed  by  the  Contras,  eight 
European volunteers  were between 1983 and 1986.68  These incidents  failed to  inspire  any public 
response from the federal government, however.  Being on good terms with the United States was of 
much greater importance than standing up to thugs who murdered aid workers, killed farmers,  and 
destroyed schools.
Another Canadian, Peter Bertie, was killed by the Sandinistas in 1987.  Bertie was a writer who 
had been travelling with the Contras and was supportive of their cause.  He travelled with them on 
eight missions between 1984 and his death, wearing the Contra battledress with a tiny Canadian flag 
pinned to it.  He was killed while accompanying the Contras to a battle with the Sandinistas in March 
of that year.69  This incident did not draw much of a response from the federal government either, 
though it should be obvious that an enormous difference exists between someone who follows soldiers 
into battle wearing a soldier's uniform (as Bertie had) and a pastor building a home for the disabled.
Church  groups  continued  pushing  for  stronger  involvement  on  the  part  of  the  federal 
government.  In March of 1986, a telegram was sent to the government which urged it to put pressure 
on the United States to support the peace efforts that were ongoing in the region, and in which Canada 
was taking an active role.  The telegram was signed by a large number of prominent figures in both 
Catholic  and  Protestant  churches,  including  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Canadian  Council  of 
Churches, the Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, the moderator for the Presbyterian Church of 
Canada,  the  Executive  Secretary  of  the  Council  of  Christian  Reformed  Churches  in  Canada,  the 
executive director for well known Catholic aid group Canadian Catholic Organization for Development 
and Peace, and a number of Roman Catholic bishops and other prelates from all regions of the country. 
A story about this telegram was front page news in the Toronto Star.70  
67 "Canadian Priest Murdered by Contras, Bishop Says", Toronto Star (March 27, 1986), A20.
68 North, 109.
69 "Toronto Writer Believed Killed With Rebels In Nicaragua Battle", Toronto Star (March 22, 1987), A2.
70 "17 Church Leaders Urge Mulroney to Oppose Reagan's Nicaraguan Policy", Toronto Star (March 18, 1986), A1.
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As was the case with the efforts of Canada's NGOs, church groups in Canada were united on the 
issue of development in Nicaragua despite differences they might otherwise have had.  Almost every 
major  Christian  denomination  was  lobbying  the  government  on  the  issue,  including  leaders  from 
Anglican, Evangelical, Presbyterian, and Roman Catholic churches, and members of these churches 
represented  every  region  of  Canada.   In  Central  America,  there  were  often  arguments  within  the 
Catholic Church over how to respond to development issues.  The Liberation Theology movement had 
many supporters, especially among the poor, rural residents who made up most of Central America's 
population, but in Central America the Church hierarchy was far from united on issues of development 
and peace.  In contrast to their Central American counterparts, Canadian churches appear to have been 
much more united, as there were no prominent rebuttals of their views  from other religious leaders in 
major forums such as the press.
In 1986, several of these leaders appeared before the House of Commons Special Committee on 
the  Peace Process  in  Central  America  to  help  inform the  committee  about  what  was  occurring in 
Nicaragua.  Many people had visited the country as a part of religious delegations and they were able to 
provide unique insights that the government could not readily gain on its own because of the limited 
diplomatic representation in the region.  A representative from the Canadian Council of Churches told 
the Committee that they wanted Canada to tie its aid program to "true human development" and a 
respect for human rights.71  Neither of these things were criteria for aid at the time, though they would 
be made so one year later.72  The Canadian Council of Churches wanted the government to favour an 
approach to  development  that  was very much like Liberation Theology;  they thought  that  aid  and 
economic development should be approached only in ways that were compatible with human dignity.73 
71 Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America.  Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence on the Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America. 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament. (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1986-88), 2:7.
72 Canadian International Development Agency. Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance. 
(Hull, Quebec: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 28.
73 Special Committee On The Peace Process In Central America, "Minutes of Proceedings", 2:7.
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This contradicted the approach of both the Liberals and the Conservatives, who favoured free market 
capitalism as the path to development. The religious leaders also complained that the government was 
defining human rights only in terms of civil and political rights, leaving out economic, social,  and 
cultural rights, which were at the heart of the independence movement in Nicaragua.  They praised the 
Nicaraguan government for its  dedication to equitable development:  illiteracy had been reduced to 
about 10-12 percent from about 50 percent at the time of the revolution, a health services network was 
being built that  was repeatedly praised in the international community,  and land reform was being 
carried out that was enabling workers to enjoy the fruits of their own labour.74  These programs were all 
supported extensively by ordinary Canadians, but not by the federal government.
Why Did Canadians Support Nicaragua?
Canadians  took an  immense  interest  in  what  was  occurring  in  Nicaragua.   A special  joint 
committee on international relations in 1986 received more submissions on Central America than on 
any other subject.75  A report released by another government committee revealed that parliamentarians, 
ministers, and committees received more mail on Central America than "virtually any other aspect of 
Canadian relations with the Third World."76  Based on Canada's aid policies and foreign affairs history, 
this is not what one would expect to see.  The areas typically targeted for CIDA aid have been the 
Commonwealth  Caribbean,  due to  its  former  association with the British  empire,  and South  Asia, 
where Canada's attempts to fight "communist expansionism" date back to the Colombo Plan of the 
1950s.   The  Ethiopian  famine  of  1984-85  -  not  the  Contra  war  -  was  the  most  visible  issue  in 
international development.  And yet, the Canadian public took an exceptional and unusual interest in 
the plight of the Nicaraguan people.  The federal government was not any more heavily involved in the 
74 Special Committee On The Peace Process In Central America, "Minutes of Proceedings", 2:10.
75 "On Nicaragua: It's Time To Speak Out", Toronto Star (July 26, 1986), B2.
76 Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America. Supporting the Five: Canada 
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region than other countries were; Sweden provided Nicaragua with $26 million in aid in 1987-88, for 
example.77  Yet the people of Sweden did not donate on nearly the scale that Canadians did.  Of the 
approximately $5 million in private aid raised in the West each year for Nicaragua, Canadians gave 
more than two-thirds.  
While support for Nicaragua was most visibly associated with the NDP or Canada's churches, 
many Canadians who were not members of those groups were also supportive.  Within the federal 
government, members of both the Liberals and, to a lesser extent, the Progressive Conservatives were 
sympathetic to Nicaragua.  There was one factor which seemed to connect all of these groups though, 
and that was concern about the actions of the United States.  As Clark correctly points out, there is a 
recurring phenomenon in Canada of Canadians taking interest in the United States using its power in 
ways of which Canadians do not approve.78  Unlike other nations which took interest in the activities in 
Central  America,  such as  Sweden or  West  Germany,  which are  geographically separated  from the 
United States, Canadians constantly feel the influence of their superpower neighbour.  Despite having 
relatively little in common historically,  Canadians were able to relate to Nicaraguans because they 
understood what it meant to have the United States attempting to influence domestic policies in ways 
that were unwelcome.
A letter to the editor printed in the Toronto Star made the connection perfectly clear:
Despite the deep concern sensible people everywhere feel at his hate-campaign fabrications  
against  Nicaragua,  the Reagan administration's appeal is not to reason.  Its real pitch is to  
wealthy right-wing Americans whose monies have so far provided much more funding to the 
Contras  than  the  U.S.  government  itself.   Canadians  wanting  an  independent  Canada,  
beware.79 (emphasis added)
77 North, 107.  North does not clarify what the breakdown of this aid was, however.  Figures for Canada's aid to Nicaragua 
that are reported often include loans, emergency assistance, or other things which are quite a bit different from technical 
assistance or project aid.  It is possible that substantially less than $26 million was actually provided as direct bilateral 
aid.  Also of interest is the fact that Sweden's government was donating so much more than Canada's despite having only 
a third of the population.
78 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
79 "Could Canada Be Next?", Toronto Star (April 8, 1986), A16.  
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Nicaraguan embassy personnel also made the link explicit.  Nicaragua's consul general declared 
that "Ronald Reagan and other United States presidents have no respect for countries like Canada and 
Nicaragua and treat them as minions."  The reason, he said, was that the United States was not fond of 
countries that stood up for their rights.80  Whether he meant the people of Canada or the government of 
Canada is  unclear.   The  federal  government  had stood up to  the U.S.  to  a  small  degree,  but  was 
generally interested in keeping relations between the countries strong.  It may be that the consul general 
was referring to the people of Canada, who had shown a considerable willingness to try to counter-
balance U.S. actions in the region by donating considerably in terms of time and money.  This would be 
a sensible connection to make,  as the Sandinistas were pushing a revolution that worked from the 
grassroots within Nicaragua, so support for grassroots efforts in Canada made perfect sense.
Conclusion
The Canadian public was very active in raising money for development efforts in Nicaragua. 
When the Sandinistas first came to power, labour and church groups from Canada were able to make 
contact with the new government before Canada's federal government was because they were already 
active in the region, which the government was not.  Canadians donated in the immediate aftermath of 
the  civil  war,  when  the  federal  government  was  doing  little,  and  they  continued  to  do  so  in  the 
following years while the government was still figuring out what its response would be.  Private aid 
efforts ballooned dramatically after the first few years of Sandinista rule.  One aid organisation, Tools 
For Peace,  went from not  existing in 1980, to donating $25,000 of fishing equipment  in 1981, to 
providing $1 million worth of varied supplies in 1983; it  continued to grow after that.   Canadians 
provided almost all of the private aid that was raised for Nicaragua during this period.  They donated 
more money than did their own government during several years, particularly up until 1987 when the 
80 "Nicaraguan Consul Calls Reagan 'Bully'", Toronto Star (September 30, 1985), D23.
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federal government began providing drastically increased aid to Nicaragua.  They also donated far 
more  than  the  citizens  of  any  other  Western  nation,  even  nations  whose  governments  gave  more 
generously than Canada's.  
The presence that Canadian citizens provided in Nicaragua was quite large.  In 1986 there were 
300  Canadian  private  aid  organisations  operating  in  the  country,  and  the  Nicaraguan  government 
estimated that several thousand Canadians had visited Nicaragua between 1979 and 1986.  According 
to Nicaragua's consul general, he could not "think of any country that has done more for Nicaragua 
than Canada has."  He went on to state that "[t]he truth is that there isn't a place in our country that you 
can go where the Canadian presence isn't felt."81  Nicaragua's ambassador also recognised that it was 
the citizens of Canada and not their government who were truly helping his country, saying "[t]o be 
very truthful, our real links are with Canadian non-governmental organizations, church groups, unions, 
and  so  on."82  Even  when  the  federal  government  did  provide  more  money,  it  never  got  behind 
Nicaragua's development efforts in the same way that private citizens did.
And  it  was  because  of  the  tremendous  support  for  development  in  Nicaragua  within  the 
Canadian public that the federal government was forced to take such an active role in the region.  At the 
end of Nicaragua's civil war Canadian private aid was quickly raised by unions while the Progressive 
Conservatives were slow to respond, and the Liberals did not look any better after they took office and 
private  aid  rose  far  more  quickly  than  official  development  assistance  did.   Canadians  also  put 
considerable pressure on their government to act in Central America.  They did it directly, by writing to 
their MPs and making submissions to Parliamentary committees, and they did it indirectly through 
opinion polling that showed the strong support for a peaceful resolution in the region.  If it was not for 
the strong, consistent support for Nicaragua shown across wide swathes of Canada's population, it is 
81 "Canadians Go To The Rescue Of Embattled Nicaraguans", Toronto Star (November 15, 1986), B5.
82 "Nicaragua: Is Canada Living Up To Its Word? Critics Say Ottawa Is Not, And Our Image Is Suffering", Toronto Star  
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doubtful that the federal government would ever have taken as much of an interest as it did.
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3
Canada - U.S. Relations and the American Influence
While the Canadian public was pushing the federal government to take a stronger stance on 
Nicaragua, the United States government was taking a stronger stance in the opposite direction.  The 
Reagan administration, which came to power in 1981, shortly after the Sandinistas did, was extremely 
hostile to Nicaragua, and seemed to view it as another Cuba.  The U.S. constantly raised fears that the 
Sandinistas were just like the Soviets and the Cubans, who were themselves actually quite different, 
saying that they wanted to violently export a communist revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere, and 
that they were a danger to the national security of the United States.  What the U.S. was actually 
concerned about  was  not  a  physical  threat  from Nicaragua,  which never  existed,  but  the threat  of 
"successful defiance".  The real fear was not that Nicaragua would physically export its revolution, but 
that  the  Sandinistas  would  prove  that  it  was  possible  to  disobey the  imperial  master  and  chart  a 
different course of development, which could inspire other countries to do the same peacefully.83
Because of these fears within the Washington elite, allies such as Canada were pressured to 
pursue the same path as the U.S. on Nicaragua.  Canada-U.S. relations went through some interesting 
times during the Sandinista years.  The Trudeau government was not seen as being on the best of terms 
with the U.S., yet it was extremely reluctant to take actions which might anger the U.S. on the issue of 
Central  America.   The  Mulroney government  came to  power  later  in  the  80s  having  promised  to 
improve relations with the U.S.  The Progressive Conservatives also wanted to lay claim to a more 
independent  foreign  policy  for  Canada,  and  thus  were  pulled  between  trying  not  to  offend  the 
Americans and also not be seen as simply mirroring the American position.  The free trade negotiations 
which were occurred while the Tories were in power have been seen as being a tempering factor on 
83 Noam Chomsky. Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2003), 96.
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Canada's actions in Nicaragua.84
Over the course of this period, the parties who held power in Canada were rarely critical of 
American policy.  Both the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives tended to frame their criticisms 
of American actions as criticisms of "outside intervention", which included the Soviet Union in an 
attempt to avoid offending anyone, though there was never any real threat of Soviet expansionism in 
Nicaragua.   It  was also part  of Canada's long-standing practice of framing its policies in terms of 
international  institutions  and  obligations,  which  both  the  Trudeau  and  Mulroney  governments 
frequently  did.   Neither  government  refrained  from criticising  American  actions  entirely,  and  the 
United Nations was considered to be an acceptable place to criticise the U.S., though sparingly, and 
only if it was another country which had brought forward the motion.  Within both governments, and 
certainly  within  the  civil  service,  there  was  a  solid  level  of  support  for  American  actions  and 
interpretations, though Canada's official response never directly mirrored that of the U.S.  In the end, 
the Canadian and American governments wanted essentially the same thing in Nicaragua - a liberal, 
capitalist government sympathetic to Western business interests.  The main difference was that the U.S. 
was willing to wage war to accomplish this, while Canada tried to push for it through diplomacy and 
wanted to  see the result  achieved through elections.85  Canada's  actions in Nicaragua were largely 
aimed at increasing the stability of the region peacefully, but its policy still mirrored that of the U.S. in 
a number of important ways.
The American Position Under Carter and Reagan
The Jimmy Carter  administration  in  the  United  States  was  known for  having  a  much less 
aggressive  attitude  toward  the  Sandinista  government  than  was  the  Ronald  Reagan  government. 
84 Jonathan Lemco. Canada and the Crisis in Central America. (New York: Praeger, 1991), 21.
85 This particular issue, of Canada wanting a liberal, capitalist democracy in Nicaragua will be addressed in more detail in 
the following chapter on Canada's aid program.
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However, while Carter  did recognise the Sandinistas as the governing party of Nicaragua after  the 
revolution took place in 1979, in the lead up his administration attempted to prevent them from coming 
to power in the first place.  They hoped they could orchestrate a "peaceful" transition from the Somoza 
regime to a more moderate but still  pro-U.S. regime and cut-off the chance for the FSLN to take 
power.86  When it seemed unlikely that this would occur through negotiations, they tried to use the 
Organisation of American States to orchestrate  a "peace force" which would ensure this  objective. 
Only after Mexico led the effort to derail the creation of such a peace force did Carter grudgingly 
accept that the Sandinistas would be the governing party of Nicaragua.87  While he did not want the 
FSLN in power, Carter was at least willing to work with them somewhat.  The U.S. provided aid to 
Nicaragua for the first 18 months after the Sandinistas came to power, under the belief that it was more 
likely to have some influence with the Sandinistas, who were none too fond of the U.S., by providing 
aid than by being belligerent.88  This attitude of cautious acceptance characterised the Carter years, 
which lasted until the beginning of 1981.
Ronald Reagan came to office having promised to restore the prominence of the U.S. on the 
world stage.  Taking a hard line in Central America was part of that pledge, and so aid to Nicaragua 
was cut-off almost immediately after Reagan took power.  The Reagan administration frequently linked 
the Sandinistas to two long-standing opponents of the U.S.: Cuba and the Soviet Union.  Their main 
concern  was  Nicaraguan  support  for  rebels  in  El  Salvador  who  were  seeking  to  overthrow  the 
government which the U.S. supported there.  They claimed that both the Sandinistas and the Soviets 
were supporting the rebels, drawing links between all three groups.89    Daniel Ortega, leader of the 






operate around the Nicaraguan border, and pledged to stop doing so.90  The Reagan administration said 
that it did not believe that Ortega was negotiating in good faith, and continued to accuse the Sandinistas 
of supporting Salvadoran rebels.  They accused the FSLN of being belligerently anti-American.91
This is  the stance that R.A. Pastor,  who was an official  in the Carter  administration,  takes. 
While Pastor is somewhat critical of Reagan's hard-line stance, he suggests that the military build-up in 
Nicaragua throughout the 1980s was the result of "anti-Americanism".92  He was similarly concerned 
about the prospect of a group hostile to U.S. interests coming to power in the region and allying itself 
with an rival of the U.S.93  A more likely explanation is that those actions were a response to American 
actions and not the cause of them.  The increase in the size of the Nicaraguan military was the result of 
quite rational fears in Nicaragua that the U.S. was a threat to them.  Based on the build-up of American 
military staff in Honduras and the history of American interventionism in the region - including the 
invasion of Grenada in 1983 - the Sandinistas had ample reason to be concerned that the U.S. would 
invade them.
Relations Under Trudeau and the Possibility of an American Invasion
In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  revolution  in  Nicaragua,  Canada  did  not  have  a  major 
response.   The Joe Clark government  officially recognised the Sandinistas as the legitimate ruling 
government shortly after they forced Somoza to leave the country by taking over Managua, as had the 
Carter government.  A spokesperson for the government declared that Canada was looking forward to a 
"fruitful and mutually profitable" relationship with the new regime.94  The Trudeau government which 
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refused to acknowledge their legitimacy.  The difference had less to do with any intention of setting out 
on an independent path and more to do with Canada's long-standing tradition of recognising popularly 
supported governments, as it had done in places such as Cuba.
For the next couple of years, however, Canada had little to do with Nicaragua.  Virtually no aid 
was provided, and the government did not publicly address the issue.  There was also some dispute 
over how to view the FSLN within the Canadian civil service.  Some members of the new government 
were described as "doctrinaire Marxists", while embassy staff in Costa Rica expressed concern that the 
members  of  the  new  coalition  who  had  business  ties  would  be  isolated  or  made  figureheads.95 
Canadian diplomats may have been somewhat sympathetic to American views that the Sandinistas 
were  too  left-wing,  but  they  also  thought  that  the  U.S.  was  being  somewhat  paranoid  about  the 
likelihood of Nicaragua actually posing a physical threat.96  Throughout the time that the Sandinistas 
remained in office,  some elements of the Canadian civil  service continued to  be skeptical  of their 
intentions.
It was not until 1981 that different views were heard in the House of Commons over Canada's 
role in the region in relation to the U.S., which is not surprising given that it would take some time to 
react once Reagan had come to power and taken a hard-line on dissent in the region.  The role of the 
U.S. in El Salvador, where the U.S. was supportive of far-right politicians associated with widespread 
human rights abuses, was what initially drew public and Parliamentary scrutiny.  Despite the position 
of the government that "third parties" (meaning the U.S. and the Soviet Union) should not be getting 
involved in the politics of the region, Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan told the 
media that Canada would not make any official protest of the decision of the U.S. to send military 
weapons and advisors to El Salvador.  According to MacGuigan, Canada would not "pass judgement on 




area or the absence of any real information."97  This statement was indicative of two recurring elements 
of the Canadian response while MacGuigan was acting minister.  The first was that MacGuigan would 
repeatedly claim that he had no knowledge of American policy.  The other was that Canada suffered 
from a lack of information about the region itself due its small diplomatic representation in the region.98
The latter problem posed difficulties for Canada in its ability to properly assess the situation on 
the  ground.   R.V.  Gorham,  the  Assistant  Under-Secretary  for  the  Bureau  of  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean Affairs, appeared before a House of Commons committee in 1982 and told it that he had no 
knowledge  of  any  Canadian  companies  which  had  been  nationalised  in  Nicaragua.99  However, 
Noranda's Empressa Minera had been taken over in the final days of the civil war, and was nationalised 
shortly afterward.100  It is unclear whether Gorham was genuinely uninformed about the takeover, or 
whether he had other reasons for making the remark.  
The Liberals seemed to more or less repeat the American line in Parliament.  MacGuigan told 
Parliament that the United States claimed to have "incontrovertible evidence" that communist arms 
were being  shipped to  Nicaragua  through El  Salvador,  and  that  some of  these weapons had been 
identified as American weapons left behind in Vietnam.101  He would not criticise the U.S. for arming 
right wing extremists, but elements on the far left with weapons simply could not be tolerated.  The 
evidence they claimed to have was never produced, nor even shown to MacGuigan, as evidenced by his 
remark that the U.S. merely "claimed" to have it.
When  he  was  asked  by  Pauline  Jewett,  the  NDP's  external  affairs  critic,  to  condemn  the 
suggestion  made  by  the  U.S.  that  the  government  of  Nicaragua  should  be  violently  overthrown, 
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MacGuigan responded by saying that he did not anticipate the U.S. taking action.102  This is an odd 
response to the United States openly suggesting that such an idea would be a good thing.  The Liberals 
also claimed to believe that the U.S. had no intention of invading Grenada, which they did in 1983. 
Jim Manly of the NDP questioned the Liberals on this.  If the U.S. lied to Canada about Grenada, what 
reason did Canada have to believe the U.S. when it said it had no plans to invade Nicaragua, especially 
in light of the 5,000 army personnel who were operating in Honduras?103  Plans to invade Nicaragua 
were also under way in the U.S.  Oliver North, well known for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal 
(where the U.S. had sold arms to Iran in order to raise money for the Contras) drew up plans to arrest 
Central American activists (within the U.S.) for an indefinite duration in the event that the invasion was 
ever carried out.104  The U.S. was searching for a pretext to invade Nicaragua, and even went so far as 
to attempt to create one; one of the main goals of their support for the Contras was to draw Nicaragua 
into  attacking  Honduras,  which  would  give  the  United  States  an  excuse  to  invade  Nicaragua  and 
overthrow its leadership.105  There was ample evidence that the United States harboured aggressive 
intentions towards Nicaragua (and much of Central America), and given American actions in places 
like  Cuba,  an  invasion  of  Nicaragua  should  have  seemed  likely.106  MacGuigan,  however,  told 
Parliament that the U.S. did not harbour aggressive intentions.
While plans had been made for a potential invasion of Nicaragua by the Americans, it never 
took place.  Instead, the U.S. used the Contras, who they funded for hundreds of millions of dollars 
over the course of the 1980s.  The Contras were made up of a variety of groups who were unhappy 
with the revolution in Nicaragua, but the foremost among these was the former National Guard, which 
had fled in the wake of the revolution.  The National Guard had been Somoza's hit squad, eliminating 
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political  opponents  and  intimidating  the  population.   They  had  been  used  by  Canadian  mining 
companies  as  well,  which  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  Noranda's  Empressa  Minera  mine  was 
nationalised during the revolution.107  The Contras waged guerrilla warfare on the new regime, killing 
Sandinistas and civilians alike, aiming to cause destruction rather than directly taking aim at the FSLN 
leadership.  They operated out of Honduras where U.S. military staff and advisors were stationed to aid 
them.  So, while the United States may not have ever launched a direct invasion of Nicaragua with their 
own troops, they did spend hundreds of millions of dollars funding a war against Nicaragua fought at 
least partially on their own behalf by troops who had helped secure U.S. interests under the Somozas. 
U.S. troops may not have entered Nicaragua, but they were present in Honduras where they helped 
train and support the Contras.  For all intents and purposes the United States did invade Nicaragua, and 
carried out a war aimed at regime changed for a decade.  It should have been plainly obvious what was 
occurring in Central America, but the Liberals claimed to have no suspicions.
Within the civil service, there seemed to be a lack of concern over the formation of the Contras. 
Canada's ambassador in Costa Rica told a Parliamentary committee that Canadian officials  did not 
consider the National Guard to be a factor.  The reason he gave for this was that the National Guard 
were not part of the group of dissidents who were proposing to "champion a democratic system".108 
Somehow the fact that they were not aiming for a peaceful resolution meant that they were not to be 
worried about, however one comes to such a conclusion.  According to the ambassador, the National 
Guard were neither "visible" nor were they a "contentious factor".109  At this point, however, the United 
States  had  been  organising  the  National  Guard  into  a  fighting  force  for  well  over   year.   If  the 
ambassador  did not  know about  this  he clearly should have,  and Parliament  certainly would have 
wanted to know as well.
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The NDP continued to press the Liberals to take a stand on American actions in the region.  Bob 
Ogle requested that the government protest to the United States about its "destabilizing influence" in 
the region.110  Charles Lapointe responded on behalf of the government that Canada had told the U.S. 
through  its  embassy  that  it  did  not  approve  of  interference  in  the  "domestic  affairs  of  foreign 
countries".111  This was as harsh as most of Canada's criticism of the United States in regards to this 
issue would get throughout the 1980s.  More frequently, the government would respond by claiming 
that it was against  any  interference or aggression in the region, which was meant to imply that the 
Soviet Union was also a destabilising force in Nicaragua, which it never was.  This was precisely the 
tactic that Lapointe took a few months later when Ogle again requested that the government condemn 
U.S.  actions,  this  time  referring  to  joint  U.S./Honduran aggression.112  The  government  frequently 
avoided  answering  the  specific  question  asked,  instead  responding  with  a  generic  remark  about 
Canada's views on international relations more broadly.
Prime Minister Trudeau rarely spoke about Canada's position on Nicaragua, as his Secretary of 
State for External Affairs handled questions on the topic.  However, Trudeau did speak about the issue 
in front of the House of Commons on a small number of occasions, as he did in May 1983 in an 
exchange with the leader of the NDP, Ed Broadbent.  On this occasion, Trudeau sounded remarkably 
like his minister.  Instead of criticising the United States, as the NDP and a large number of Canadians 
had been pressuring him to do, he simply stated that Canada's position was that  all powers should 
refrain from intervening in the affairs of Central American states.  It was immaterial that the Soviet 
Union was not actively involved in attempting to overthrow a democratic regime in Nicaragua, as the 
U.S. was.  When pressed by Broadbent to criticise the Americans for attempting to overthrow the 
Sandinistas, Trudeau astoundingly said that the United States wanted a peace agreement in Central 
110Bob Ogle. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (December 1, 1982), 21167.
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America just  as Canada did!113  These were all  lines that  had previously been spoken by Minister 
MacGuigan.  It is also difficult to believe that anyone in the government genuinely thought the United 
States wanted a peace agreement.  According to one former ambassador to much of Central America, 
the United States was uninterested in anything other than the "total eradication of leftism" through 
physical force.114  The Liberals were unwilling to publicly say so, however.
The government even refused to get involved when Canadian goods were being routed into 
Central America in support of the Contras.  In May of 1983 it was revealed that bullets manufactured in 
Canada were being used by the Contras.  The bullets were found in a rebel camp in crates which were 
marked "Made in Canada" and "NATO", and were believed to have been shipped into Nicaragua by the 
CIA.115  What was the government's response to the redirection of goods that were ostensibly for the 
protection of the North Atlantic to help wage an illegal war of aggression against a popularly supported 
government?  There was no response.  There was, at least, no public response.  Representations may 
have been made to American officials behind closed doors, but there were no remarks or actions made 
publicly, either in the House of Commons or the press.
On only one occasion on did the Liberals made a public statement which was clearly critical in 
nature and specifically named the United States.  It was made by Allan MacEachen, who had become 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  External  Affairs  in  September  1982,  and  had  been  a  minister  in  one 
department or another consecutively from April 1963 until the Mulroney government came to power in 
1984 (except  for  the  brief  period  where  Joe  Clark  led  a  minority  government).   MacEachen was 
questioned  by  a  journalist  about  the  mining  of  Nicaragua's  harbours  by  the  U.S.,  to  which  he 
responded:
Canada certainly doesn't approve of the mining of Nicaraguan waters.  Canada thinks it's not 
only a violation of international law but also that it  is likely to contribute adversely to the  
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tension that already exists . . . [w]e have expressed our disagreement with the United States on a 
number of occasions both publicly and privately.
However, MacEachen quickly tempered the remark by adding that Canada was against the "military 
presence of any third party in Central America.  That includes the United States and includes any other 
foreign presence like the Cubans or the Soviet Union" (emphasis added).116  Even in this situation, 
though, the Liberal Cabinet minister did not unreservedly criticise the U.S., even though he was clearly 
upset with their decision.
While the Liberals were pressed to take a more active stance against the United States by the 
NDP (and members of their own caucus, like Stanley Hudecki),  some members of the Progressive 
Conservatives pressed them to side more strongly with the American position.  The most prominent 
member of the Tories in this regard was Sinclair Stevens, their External Affairs critic.  Stevens was a 
vocal critic of the Sandinistas from the early days of their rule.  In 1982, he expressed concern that 
Canada was focussing its criticism on human rights violations in El Salvador, which had tried to go the 
"electoral route", when Nicaragua had had no elections.117  What Stevens neglected to mention was that 
the elections in El Salvador had been won by Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of El Salvador's right-wing 
death squads, and that it is rather difficult to organise elections in the immediate aftermath of a civil 
war in a country like Nicaragua that had been ruled by despots for decades and was under constant 
threat of attack from counter-revolutionaries funded by the world's largest military power.  In fact, 
while the Sandinistas originally pledged to hold elections in 1985, they felt that progress was sufficient 
to move them up one year and held them in 1984 instead.
Stevens was quite pleased to repeat Reagan administration claims in Parliament.  On May 11, 
1983, he stood before the House of Commons and told Parliament that there were Cuban soldiers in 
Nicaragua who were part of a large arms build-up.  He wanted the government to institute a review of 
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its aid to Nicaragua and potentially cut them off, as had been done in El Salvador on the basis of human 
rights abuses.118  There were Cubans in Nicaragua, but they were doctors and teachers.  The large arms 
build-up that was occurring was a result of fears within Nicaragua that the United States was planning 
an invasion,  a well  founded fear,  as  was demonstrated earlier.   Other members of the Progressive 
Conservatives were sympathetic to the American view.  MP Robert Wenman cited a Washington Post 
article  claiming that  the  Sandinistas  were  worse  violators  of  human  rights  than  the  Somozas  had 
been.119  David Kilgour told Parliament that he believed the Sandinistas were committing human rights 
violations that were comparable to what was occurring in El Salvador and Guatemala.120  On the whole, 
Tory MPs were strongly supportive of Reagan and U.S. policy in the region, making the Liberals seem 
like the moderate party in between the pro-U.S. views of the Conservatives and the pro-Sandinista 
views of the NDP.  When Brian Mulroney brought the Progressive Conservatives to power in the fall of 
1984, though, the reality turned out to be somewhat different.
Mulroney, Clark, Reagan, and Shultz
When the Tories came to power in 1984, it was believed that the new Secretary of State for 
External Affairs  would be Sinclair  Stevens,  who was more or less in line with Reagan's  views on 
Central  America.   Because he was their  most  outspoken MP on the issue of Central  America,  the 
Progressive Conservatives had become associated with Stevens' views.  Instead of Stevens, though, 
Mulroney named the  more  moderate  Joe Clark as  Secretary of  State  for  External  Affairs.   It  was 
decided  that  the  party  should  re-examine  its  position  on  Central  America,  partly  because  of  the 
immense public interest in the ongoing troubles in the region, and partly because some people within 
the party were concerned that they had become publicly associated with a position that they had never 
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actually discussed.121  Clark's approach to international affairs had more in common with the Liberal 
tradition of framing Canada's policies within the parameters of international law and institutions such 
as the United Nations, as opposed to Stevens who was in sympathy with the U.S.  With Clark and 
Mulroney at the helm, Canada did open up relations with Nicaragua somewhat, but relations with the 
U.S. stayed more or less on the same course as they had under the Liberals.  The federal government 
would continue to support the right of Nicaragua to self-determination while refusing to be actively 
critical of American interference with that right.
The first action that the Tories took towards Nicaragua was to refuse to send observers to the 
country for the elections in 1984, though they did note that some Canadian aid organisations were 
sending  their  own  observers.122  However,  even  though  observers  were  not  sent,  the  Tories  did 
recognise the results as legitimate and the Sandinistas as the democratically elected government of 
Nicaragua.   This  was  one  of  the  reasons  that  Nicaragua  received  an  increased  amount  of  aid  in 
subsequent years.123  The United States claimed that the results were invalid and non-representative and 
continued to fund the Contra attempt to violently overthrow the FSLN.
Mulroney,  like  Trudeau  before  him,  rarely  spoke  publicly  about  Canada's  role  in  Central 
America, instead leaving the issue to his Secretary of State for External Affairs and his Minister for 
External Relations, Monique Vezina.  He did speak about the issue on a couple of occasions though, 
generally in an attempt to assert that his government was developing a more forceful and independent 
foreign policy than previous governments had, something Clark was also interested in proving.  When 
Jean Chrétien questioned the government about the role of the United States' trade embargo against 
Nicaragua and how it  would affect  Canadian companies, Mulroney took the rare step of making a 
public statement against the United States, saying that Canada was against the embargo, which was 
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neither "in the interests of Canada nor consistent with our traditions."  Having made this slight criticism 
of American policy, he went on to say that he hoped that the House of Commons would "applaud that 
declaration of independence in foreign policy."124  Worth noting is that Mulroney's criticism of the 
United States was not based on its impact on the people of Nicaragua, but its impact on Canada.
While the government's response was to assure Parliament that the American embargo was not 
going to affect Canadian business - and that they had gained assurances that the embargo would not be 
enforced against Canadian subsidiaries of American firms - the Tories were not very active in fighting 
against it  either.  When Monique Vezina was asked if the government had any plans to encourage 
Canadian companies to move into areas of trade with Nicaragua that had been vacated by American 
companies due to the embargo, her response was that Canada would follow its present course in its 
trade relations with Nicaragua,125 which is to say that the government had no intention of pushing for 
increased Canadian aid to try to fill the gap.  
Not  only  would  Canada  not  try  to  benefit  from  the  embargo,  but  aid  organisations  and 
Nicaraguan officials both accused the government of indirectly assisting it.  Aid groups claimed that 
they had to go through stepped-up customs inspections and paperwork for aid shipments during 1986, 
which was delaying the delivery of aid  by both church groups and aid NGOs.  One organisation, 
Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO), complained that it had encountered resistance from 
Ottawa in its attempts to get permits for the equipment to be used in development projects because 
some of  it  was  manufactured  in  the  U.S.   The  Nicaraguan embassy also  complained,  saying  that 
Canada was the only Western country which had singled it out for stronger customs inspections.  It was 
not only through stepped-up inspections of aid that the government helped to enforce the American 
embargo.  In 1986, government-imposed quotas on beef reduced Nicaragua's exports of beef to Canada 
124Brian Mulroney. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (May 6, 1985), 4431.
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by half.126  This was an unusual step considering that Canada had extended a large line of credit to 
Nicaragua to help them develop its dairy industry less than two years prior.  Clark considered this to be 
one of Canada's most important investments in the region.127  However, it was not just because of the 
American  embargo  that  Canada  was  restricting  beef  imports,  as  Ottawa  was  under  pressure  from 
Canadian farmers not to allow beef into the country.128  That Ottawa chose a protectionist approach 
must be seen as ironic given the ongoing free trade discussions with the United States at the time.
However, the party was not entirely united on how to respond to the Americans.  During a 
committee meeting in 1985, Nicaragua's deputy foreign minister requested that Canada provide them 
with increased foreign aid.  Tory committee members responded by saying that instead of increasing 
aid,  Canada  should  join  the  American  embargo.129  One  Progressive  Conservative  MP,  Marcel 
Tremblay, expressed concern that Nicaragua might be locked into the Soviet Bloc, noting that Canada 
did not want Nicaragua destabilising its neighbours, even though Nicaragua was the country being 
destabilised  by  its neighbour,  Honduras.   Tremblay  took  a  very  American  approach  to  the  issue, 
expressing concern about a long list of human rights abuses in Nicaragua, while making only a minor 
side-comment about the extent of human rights abuses in neighbouring El Salvador or Guatemala, 
where right-wing forces had power.  Tremblay said that Nicaragua was the one area in Central America 
where there was the most room for improvement.130  However, these sorts of comments were made 
much less frequently once the Conservatives came to power than they were when they were the Official 
Opposition.
Other than his criticism of the U.S. embargo, which his government helped enforce to a small 
degree, Mulroney's reactions to American behaviour in Central America were normally more in line 
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with those of the previous Liberal government.  On a tour of Washington, when he was asked by media 
outlets whether he thought it was acceptable for the United States to provide military support for the 
Contras, he repeatedly side-stepped the issue, refusing to give a solid answer, and repeating the broad 
refrain that Canada supported a peaceful resolution to the crisis.131  What was America's role in this 
peaceful resolution?  Mulroney was not saying.  If anything, he seemed vaguely supportive of the U.S. 
In the fall of 1986, Mulroney told reporters that Canada was not
in  favour  of  exporting  revolution,  any  more  than  we  approve  of  third-party  intervention  
anywhere in Central America, whoever the third party may be and regardless of its legitimate 
interests in the area.132 (emphasis added)
Mulroney's emphasis on the situation being the result of a superpower conflict was odd considering that 
Clark was on record on numerous occasions saying that the problems in Nicaragua specifically were 
not manifestations  of  an  East-West  conflict.   A similar  response  was  given  the  next  month  when 
Mulroney said that despite human rights abuses by the Sandinistas, harassment of Catholic priests and 
censorship  of  journalists,  "that  doesn't  justify  Canadian involvement",133 making  sure  to  list  the 
accusations that the Americans liked to throw at the Sandinistas for good measure.
Joe Clark was often even less likely to criticise the U.S. than was Mulroney.  Clark repeatedly 
told the House of Commons that Canada should not criticise the U.S. publicly, in contrast to Mulroney 
who merely side-stepped the issue.  In January of 1986, he said that it was not the purpose of one 
sovereign country's foreign policy to "give lectures" to others about what they should do.134  A few 
months later, while being questioned again about why Canada would not criticise the United States, 
Clark said that Canada would reduce, not increase, its influence over the U.S. by offering "gratuitous 
advice".135  He did not say that Canada should not attempt to influence the U.S.; rather, he said that there 
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were other avenues which would be more productive.  It is unclear whether this approach produced any 
tangible results.
He did  provide  some light  criticism of  the  U.S.  in  public  on  a  few occasions.   After  one 
Canadian aid project in Nicaragua had been attacked by the Contras for the second time, Clark finally 
relented in the House of Commons and acknowledged that he was concerned about the American role 
in the attacks, and had written a letter to American Secretary of State George Shultz expressing this 
concern.136  On another occasion, Clark openly criticised the American mining of Nicaragua's harbours. 
He and Shultz walked out of a meeting to meet the press together, and were asked about the recent 
World Court decision that had found the United States' mining of Nicaragua's harbours to be illegal, 
ordering Washington to pay indemnities.  Shultz declared that it was a bad decision that the U.S. would 
not accept, while Clark said that it was a strong decision and Canada supported it.  According to Clark, 
the two later returned to discussing other issues without animosity, saying "that really was the way we 
were able to proceed on Central America."  He asserts that Canada was free to criticise the United 
States on Central American issues and would not suffer repercussions for having done so.137  Like 
Mulroney,  Clark  saw  Canada's  Central  American  policy  as  an  example  of  the  Progressive 
Conservative's strength and independence in the area of foreign policy.
One other vocal criticism of the U.S. was made by the Tories, and it was at the United Nations. 
On November 3, 1986, a UN resolution was put forward calling on the United States to stop aiding the 
Contras  in  accordance  with  the  recent  World  Court  judgement.   Canada  voted  in  favour  of  the 
resolution, while countries not as closely allied to the U.S., such as France, abstained.138  According to 
Mulroney, this was one of a number of occasions over the past few years where Canada's voting record 
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at  the  UN  had  shown  "unusual,  and  perhaps  unprecedented"  independence  in  foreign  policy.139 
Canada's vote on this issue was noteworthy, given the number of countries which had much less to 
potentially lose and still abstained.  The vote carried great symbolic value but no obligation of tangible 
policy initiatives.  Canada certainly did not put any pressure on the U.S. to comply with the ruling and 
pay  Nicaragua  the  indemnities  owed,  nor  did  it  take  any  action  against  the  U.S.  in  support  of 
Nicaragua.   The  vote  fit  well  within  the  Canadian  tradition  of  standing  up  for  the  importance  of 
international institutions.  While it may have been largely a symbolic gesture, it was a harsher criticism 
than the Liberals had ever made publicly.
The all-party Special  Committee on the Peace Process in Central  America was much more 
openly critical of the U.S. than the government had been.  It is worth noting that the committee's final 
report,  Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process makes clear that the 
members  of  the  committee,  comprised  of  MPs  from all  three  parties,  unanimously agreed  on  the 
recommendations in the report.  The report makes numerous explicit references to the American role in 
perpetuating the conflict and their support of the Contra insurrection.  The report stated its concern, that 
"U.S. military assistance to Honduras has grown enormously over the last few years."140  It also noted 
that  the  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Inter-American  Affairs  in  the  U.S.  had  told  the 
committee that the U.S. was not even interested in disarming the various factions.  Instead, the U.S. 
wanted  "a  rational  level  of  the  arms  race  in  Central  America."141  It  is  not  clear  on  what  level 
deliberately  supporting  an  arms  race  could  be  considered  "rational"  in  the  face  of  proposals  for 
verifiable disarmament.
The committee noted that the Soviet Union was completely supportive of the  Esquipulas II  
Agreement,  a  framework for  peace in  the region written and signed by the five Central  American 
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countries involved, while the U.S. was opposed to it.142  Concern was also expressed with the American 
position - echoed by some in the Tory caucus - that was calling for a higher standard for what would 
count as "democracy" in Nicaragua in comparison to the other countries in the region.143  The panel's 
recommendations made clear that American interference in the region had to end in order for a lasting 
peace to be possible; this was something that many Canadians had been pressing the government to 
acknowledge for some time, without success.  The committee recommended that the U.S. should end 
its embargo of Nicaragua, and abandon its policy of obstructing loans to Nicaragua at the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development  Bank.144  It  also stated that  it  "strongly urge[d]"  the U.S.  to 
maintain  the  cut-off  of  assistance  to  the  Contras  that  had  been  imposed  recently  by  Congress.145 
Unfortunately,  funding  to  the  Contras  was  restored,  and  Canada's  government  did  not  take  the 
committee's  recommendations  in  regard  to  American  relations  very  seriously.   The  fact  that  the 
suggestions were agreed to by members of the Tory caucus illuminates more of the complex dynamic 
that the party's leadership had to deal with; some in the party were pressing hard to have the Tories 
adopt the American position, while others wanted the party to publicly chastise their neighbour.  It was 
surely a difficult issue to navigate within the caucus.
One incident occurred while the Tories were in office that was quite embarrassing to them. 
Ronald Reagan made an appearance before the House of Commons on April 6, 1987, in which he 
spoke about a variety of topics, one of which was support for the Contras in Nicaragua.  Reagan tried to 
push for a change in Canada's policy in the region, telling Parliament that:
In  Nicaragua,  we  see  such  a  campaign  on  our  own  shores,  threatening  destabilization 
throughout Central America.  This is not just a question of self-protection; the higher principle is 
that the people of Nicaragua have the right to decide their own future.146
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Any future  that  complied  with  the  dictates  of  American  capitalism,  of  course.   Indeed,  the  only 
campaign of destabilisation being waged in Central America at the time was the one being undertaken 
by the Reagan administration, which would accept nothing other than the defeat of the Sandinistas; and 
the people had decided their own future, first by supporting the revolution that brought the Sandinistas 
to power, and then by voting for them in an election that was internationally observed and recognised 
by just about every country except the U.S. as being legitimate.
On this occasion, three members of the NDP had the courage to stand up to the President of the 
United States and call him out on his fabrications.  Les Benjamin cried "Shame!" while banging his fist 
on his desk; John Parry shouted "They did decide!"; and Svend Robinson demanded "Stop funding the 
Contras, Reagan!"  The Liberals and the Tories immediately let the press know that they thought the 
country was  embarrassed  by the  outburst.147  It  is  not  clear,  however,  that  Canadians  would  have 
actually been embarrassed by the remarks, which were well in line with what much of the public had 
been asking the government to say for the better part of the decade.  Canadians were deeply concerned 
about American support for the Contras and the destabilisation of the region, and they wanted Reagan 
to be clear about how they viewed his policies.  If any party had made Canadians embarrassed about 
their treatment of Reagan, it was not the NDP.
Canadian Money, American War
The  official  position  of  the  Tory government  was  to  support  the  peace  process  in  Central 
America, and that it was illegal to sell arms to either side in Nicaragua.  However, some Canadians still 
helped the Americans in their efforts to fund the Contras and violently overthrow the Sandinistas.148  In 
fact, some of these contributors were Progressive Conservative Members of Parliament.  In December 
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148 To the best of my knowledge, no Canadians provided military aid to the Sandinistas; all of the aid which came from 
people who were supportive of the revolution went towards development.
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1986, it was revealed that four PC MPs had been linked to a group that raised money for the Contras, 
the Anti-Bolshevik League.  One former Tory MP - John Gamble - was the North American chairman 
of the league, and had connections with two Toronto businessmen who were linked to the Iran-Contra 
arms scandal.  Two of the MPs (one from Toronto and one from Mississauga) had admitted to meeting 
with John Singlaub, the main American fundraiser for the Contras and a retired U.S. Army general. 
Two more MPs (one from Toronto and one from Calgary)  acknowledged that they had attended a 
fundraising dinner for the Anti-Bolshevik league, but claimed to have never met Singlaub.149  
The PC government was confronted about these revelations in the House of Commons where 
opposition MP Pauline Jewett questioned why the government did not discipline members of its caucus 
for providing money to fuel a war that the government was involved in trying to resolve peacefully. 
Clark responded that Canada was a free country, and as such, its citizens were free to raise money for 
purposes that the government disagreed with.  It was not the policy of his party to tell members that 
they could not make personal contributions to causes they supported.  He then turned the accusation 
back  at  Jewett,  claiming that  she  supported  the  state  "prohibiting  individual  private  persons  from 
contributing  to  private  undertakings  in  which  they  might  believe."150  The  answer  was  somewhat 
disingenuous.  There were already laws in Canada against providing arms to either side in the conflict. 
The government could not have been enthused about members of its own caucus funding a war which 
it was currently engaged in trying to resolve peacefully.  The Tory leaders were in a difficult position; 
on the one hand, some members of their caucus were vocally (and financially) opposed to one of the 
policies they had chosen to pursue, while on the other, Central America was a place where Clark and 
Mulroney saw an opportunity to prove the independence of their foreign policy.
While  it  may have been easy for  the Tories to  brush off  these few MPs as simply private 
members  engaging  in  private  affairs,  it  was  much  more  difficult  for  the  government  to  take  that 
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approach to another issue, the privatisation of Canadian Arsenals Limited (CAL).  CAL was a Crown 
Corporation with a strong profit margin, which did 90 percent of its business with the Department of 
Defence.  The Tories wanted to sell it.  NDP MP Lorne Nystrom criticised the government for this 
potential sale to a Montreal company, SNC Defence Products.  SNC had previously sold ammunition to 
the Contras, which was against the government's foreign policy.  Nystrom accused the government of 
being complicit in escalating the war in Nicaragua through the sale of CAL, and tried to appeal to the 
portion of the Tory caucus which was supportive of the Central American peace process to speak up 
and halt the sale.151  Nevertheless, the corporation was privatised.152
Canadian corporations were involved in supporting the Americans and the Contras as well. 
RCMP investigations of several companies and individuals occurred in the latter part of the 1980s, 
though none were ever charged.  In November 1986 it was revealed that another company operating 
out of Quebec - Propair - had sold two Canadian-made cargo planes to a "mysterious" Panamanian 
company that ended up being used by anti-government rebels in Nicaragua.153  Further details emerged 
a few months later.  Propair had not only sold the planes, but knew exactly what the planes were to be 
used for.  They had staff in El Salvador helping to maintain the planes and teaching American pilots 
how to fly them.  Both the Canadian and American governments had connections to the sale of the 
planes.  At the time that the planes were sold, 50 percent of Propair was owned by Quebecair, a Crown 
corporation.   The  company that  had bought  the planes,  Southern Air  Transport,  was  an  American 
company which had previously been owned by the CIA and was still  used by them.  The RCMP 
announced that they were investigating.154  Like other RCMP investigations into Canadian involvement 
in the Contra war, though, nothing seems to have ever come of this investigation.
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A much bigger issue in both Canadian and American media was when a Canadian connection to 
the Iran-Contra arms scandal was revealed a few weeks later.  At first, all that was known was that 
"unnamed Canadian investors" were accused of being middlemen in an arms deal with the Contras. 
The  Canadian  ambassador  to  the  United  States  expressed  displeasure  over  how  the  Canadian 
government learned about this - through the American media.  Even after the American media broke 
the story, the Reagan administration still refused to provide Canada with any information to help the 
government determine what had occurred.  It was at that point that the RCMP began investigating the 
link on its own.155  It was eventually revealed that two Toronto area businessmen, Donald Fraser and 
Ernest Miller, were accused of being involved in the arms deal, but it was unclear to what extent they 
had been involved, or if there was any solid proof that they were.156  The RCMP eventually announced 
the results of their investigation: they were not going to lay charges against Miller or Fraser.  However, 
they did not say that no arms had been sold by the two.  Rather, they said that they were unable to 
pursue the matter any further because the arms were not actually purchased in Canada.157
By the next spring, more details about Canadian involvement in the war had emerged.  Bank 
statements obtained by U.S. Senate investigators showed that the Contras had paid $432,000 into a 
Royal Bank account in Montreal.  The money was believed to have gone into an account for Trans 
World  Arms,  a  company  already under  investigation  by  the  RCMP for  shipping  arms  to  Central 
America.158  However, as in other cases of Canadian money helping to fund the Contras, no action 
appears to have ever been taken.  Of all the incidents in which Canadians were involved, of which there 
were several, no evidence that either the RCMP or the federal government ever seriously pursued any 
sort of punitive action has come to light, nor did they take any actions to prevent abuses from occurring 
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in the future.  
Another government agency - the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) - was more 
concerned  with  the  people  trying  to  stop  the  war  than  the  people  prolonging  it.   The  Security 
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC, the government's watchdog for CSIS) said in 1987 that CSIS 
was spying  on too many Canadians.   Among those the  SIRC were  concerned about  were Central 
American activists.   An SIRC report found that the agency was doing a poor job of distinguishing 
"subversion from legitimate dissent" and it was found to be supportive of the hard-line position of the 
Reagan administration.  It showed only "minimal" interest in Canadians who were raising money for 
the Contras.159  It  was peaceful activists,  not war profiteers,  who the authorities were interested in 
suppressing.   The  government  was  prepared  to  support  peace  negotiations  amongst  the  Central 
American governments,  but  not to ensure that  Canadians  who were making that peace difficult  to 
achieve were properly policed.
How Much Influence Did Canada Have?
When Joe Clark was asked in the House of Commons to more sternly and publicly criticise the 
U.S. for supporting the Contras and hindering the peace process in Central America, his response was 
typically that doing so would reduce Canada's influence, and was therefore likely to be harmful.  A 
wide variety of people disagreed with this view, however, within Parliament, the Central American 
governments, and even the American Congress.  The NDP clearly believed that Canada had influence 
with the American government, and also suggested that Canada could form a united front with similar 
European countries to collectively put pressure on the U.S. to adopt a more peaceful approach to the 
region.  Many of the Canadian people believed that as well, as is evidenced by their massive letter 
writing campaigns, constant petitions, responses to polls, and the statements made to Parliament by 
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those representing church groups or NGOs.160  The Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central 
America also held this view, as can be seen in their multiple recommendations for ways that they 
believed Canada should pressure the U.S. on the issue of the Contras.  Non-Canadians also held this 
view.  One Nicaraguan diplomat told the Globe and Mail that Canada had more influence on the United 
States than any other country in the hemisphere, and wished that Canada was more willing to use that 
influence to pressure the U.S. to change its policy.161  A few years later, a full page ad was taken out in 
the Globe and Mail by a group which included the Colombian foreign minister, urging Canada to put 
pressure on the U.S. to halt its military actions in the region.162  Evidently politicians in South and 
Central America believed that Canada was capable of playing a more forceful role than it had been.
Perhaps most tellingly, though, members of the American Congress also believed that Canada 
had the power to influence American policy in the region.  According to Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy, 
that was what he had heard from the American Congresspeople with whom he had spoken.  Axworthy 
said that the U.S. was the main obstacle to achieving peace in the region, and that Canada needed to 
speak out about American support for the Contras.  According to Axworthy, he had been told by people 
in Congress that Canada did in fact have sway over the U.S. because it was seen as being a good friend, 
and also had credibility internationally.  This was similar to the position taken by some of the South and 
Central American countries, such as Colombia.  While some aspects of Reagan's policy were illegal 
even in the U.S. (eleven people were convicted in the Iran-Contra scandal), his administration was also 
seeking  funding  through Congress.   At  the  time that  Axworthy made his  remarks,  funding  to  the 
Contras had been cut off by Congress, but voting on whether or not to reinstate it was close and hotly 
contested.  If Canada would speak out on the issue of Contra funding, it  could help sway votes in 
Congress by lending international credibility to those who wanted to vote against it but were having 
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difficulty in doing so.163  When Clark spoke of Canada not being able to influence the U.S. on this 
issue,  he  meant  that  the  Reagan  administration  would  not  be  receptive  to  public  criticism.   But 
Canada's  real  influence  lay not  in  its  ability to  sway Reagan or  his  advisors,  but  in  its  ability to 
influence Congressional voting to deny Reagan the funds that he required to provide aid to the Contras. 
Those in Congress who favoured a cut-off of aid to the Contras and were seeking to sway votes in their 
favour believed that public Canadian support for their position would have made it more tenable for 
other members of Congress to side with them.
Conclusion
Canada's relations with the United States in regard to the situation in Nicaragua were quite 
similar under both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments.  Both governments refused 
to make outright criticisms of the U.S. government except in rare circumstances.  They were willing to 
do so when institutions such as the United Nations provided them with a less charged atmosphere, but 
they were  not  willing  to  stand out  in  the  process.   Both  governments  generally  provided  generic 
responses  indicating  that  they did  not  think  it  was  acceptable  for  one  country to  interfere  in  the 
domestic affairs of another.  This usually carried with it a tacit implication that the Soviet Union and 
the United States were equally to blame for the problems in the region, even though it was fairly clear 
that the United States was trying to stir up revolution in Central America and the Soviet Union was not. 
The Soviet Union welcomed and approved of the peace process, both the earlier Contadora initiative 
and the later Esquipulas process;164 the United States simply did not want a negotiated settlement that 
would allow the Sandinistas to continue their democratic rule.  But neither Canadian government was 
willing to say so.  One possible explanation for this is that since it seemed obvious that the Soviet 
163 Lloyd Axworthy. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (December 2, 1987), 11413.
164 For obvious reasons, as - contrary to American statements - they had no real power in the region and were quite pleased 
at the possibility of U.S. power being somewhat restrained.
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Union  did  not  have  any  sway  in  the  region,  a  criticism  of  "any  superpower"  would  have  been 
understood to have been a veiled criticism of only the U.S.  This explanation does hold some power. 
However, given that there were clearly members of the Progressive Conservatives - not to mention the 
Reagan government - who genuinely did believe the Soviet Union was a threat in the region, it is not 
entirely clear that this explanation is accurate.
The Liberals  never seem to have even seriously considered taking a stronger stance on the 
Contra war or any American interference in the region.  The Progressive Conservatives did, though 
there were starkly opposed elements in the party pulling in differing directions.  Some members of the 
party wanted to join the Americans in their embargo, while others were providing money to the Contras 
to  continue  their  war.   Still  others  wanted  to  criticise  the  U.S.  more  forcefully,  and  expressed 
displeasure that the Reagan administration was interfering in on-going peace negotiations which were 
important to the Tories.  The Mulroney government was critical of the U.S. behind closed doors, both 
"at the highest level" between heads of state and Secretaries of State, and down through the diplomatic 
service.165  Aside from one or two rare and somewhat muted incidents, though, these criticisms were 
never made publicly, and they were never supported through political action.  Mulroney and Clark both 
wanted to show that Canada was capable of having an independent foreign policy, but they seem to 
have only been willing to do so without addressing the American role in the region,  a role which 
framed everything else.
As  demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  Canada's  public  provided  strong,  varied,  and 
consistent support of the people of Nicaragua, and often of the Sandinista regime as well.  The same 
can not be said of Canada's business community, particularly the aviation and arms sectors.  Several 
Canadian companies were publicly and prominently associated with the Contras, providing airplanes, 
military equipment, and armaments to the guerrillas.  Neither the Progressive Conservatives nor the 
165 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
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RCMP ever seem to have vigorously pursued any sort  of punitive action against  these companies. 
Canada's  intelligence  agency  was  not  especially  concerned  with  them either;  it  targeted  peaceful 
activists instead.  The federal government may have taken a nominally independent position on the 
peace process in Central America - particularly under the Mulroney regime - but it was only willing to 
do so when no serious action had to be taken against those who disagreed.
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4
Official Development Assistance To Nicaragua
Nicaragua was not the recipient of much official development assistance from Canada prior to 
the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty; indeed the country received no ODA of any sort in the year 
leading up to the revolution.166  While Pierre Trudeau had declared in 1968 that Canada had "substantial 
interests" in Latin America,167 Nicaragua was never given much attention.  Aid to Central America as a 
region grew rapidly in the latter  half  of the 1970s, but this aid was not typically directed towards 
Nicaragua,  going instead to  countries  like Honduras.   Further,  this  aid  was frequently tied  to  full 
interest loans from Canadian banks and tied to the purchase of Canadian goods.168  In fact, while much 
of this  money was defined as "aid",  it  was not really aid in the sense that most Canadians would 
probably define it.  The government was not in the habit of simply giving money to those in need; 
rather, aid was treated largely as an extension of domestic policy.  It may have helped the people it 
eventually reached, but that was not its primary purpose.  The main beneficiaries of Canadian aid were 
not the citizens of Central America, but the Canadian companies whose materials and products were 
purchased as part of the aid program.  
The practice of tying aid to the purchase of Canadian goods was not a new policy when the 
Sandinistas came to power; in 1979, 80 percent of Canadian aid was tied.    It was believed that untying 
aid would mean that developing countries would be using Canadian money to support the economies of 
other industrial countries which Canada was in direct competition with, to the detriment of Canada's 
place in world markets.169  Aid in the 1980s was also frequently given in the form of loans.  These loans 
166 CIDA, Annual Report 1979-80, 43.
167 Lemco, 2.
168 McFarlane, 149-50.
169 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 51.  Tied aid is the practice of giving aid on the condition that the money be spent only in 
the country providing the aid.  The problems with tied aid are numerous and beyond the scope of this paper, however, 
the OECD estimates that it may reduce the effectiveness of aid programs by as much as 1/3; see Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD Development Centre Studies: The Tying of Aid", available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_18108886_29412506_119699_1_1_1,00.html.
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came  straight  from the  Canadian  International  Development  Agency and  were  often  provided  on 
interest-free terms.  This practice continued until the 1987-88 fiscal year.  That year saw the release of 
Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance, a document detailing a new aid 
strategy for Canada.  This document was released after the conclusion of a Parliamentary committee 
which studied the role that Canada's aid should play, though many of the committee's recommendations 
were not implemented.  At that point, CIDA announced that it would no longer be providing ODA in 
the form of loans, providing all future aid as grants (though lines of credit were still  extended for 
specific projects).170  Following the report's release, the amount of untied aid was increased from 20 
percent to 30 percent, with the caveat that all untied aid must be spent locally (either in the recipient 
country  or  its  neighbours),  rather  than  being  spent  in  countries  viewed  as  Canada's  industrial 
competitors.171   While  these  changes  were  made  eventually,  for  most  of  the  period  studied  here 
Canada's aid to Nicaragua was primarily in the form of loans, not grants.  Given the problems that 
Nicaragua has had with its external debt for the past 40 years or so, it is difficult to determine whether 
Canada's "aid" to Nicaragua for much of this period was helpful or harmful.  
Nicaragua has struggled with a heavy debt load for most of its recent history.  Under the rule of 
the Somozas, Nicaragua built up a significant amount of private debt, and some multilateral debt as 
well.  In 1980, just after the Sandinistas came to power, 26 percent of Nicaragua's debt was owed to 
bilateral donors (other countries), 25 percent was owed to multilateral donors, and 48 percent was owed 
to private investors, such as banks.  The Sandinistas were quite eager to eliminate the private debt and 
their obligations to Western institutions.  To this end, they were quite successful - when they left office 
in 1990, the Sandinistas had changed the make-up of Nicaragua's debt obligations considerably.  At that 
point, only 11 percent of their debt was multilateral, and just 19 percent was owed to private donors, a 
huge change in just a decade.  However, while much of this old debt had been eliminated, the country 
170 CIDA.  Sharing Our Future.
171 CIDA, "Sharing Our Future", 52.
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was not necessarily any better  off as significant amounts of money had been borrowed from other 
countries.  Nicaragua's debt burden in 1990 was 70 percent bilateral, money borrowed primarily from 
the Soviet bloc and Mexico.172  Canada never loaned Nicaragua money on the scale that the Soviet 
Union did, but it was contributing to Nicaragua's ongoing debt problems as well.  It should be pointed 
out that CIDA's annual reports between 1978-79 and 1990-91 never show Nicaragua paying back more 
than $70 000 a year.173  It seems likely that Nicaragua was paying back so little because it simply could 
not afford to pay any more, since at that rate it would have taken Nicaragua centuries to pay back all 
the money it owed Canada.  At a repayment rate of $70,000 per year, assuming an interest rate of zero, 
it would have taken Nicaragua 328 years to pay off the loans accumulated from Canada in the 1984-85 
fiscal year alone (approximately $23 million).174
Perhaps  the  clearest  example  of  Canada's  troubled  policy  with  respect  to  loans  given  to 
Nicaragua can be found in Canada's support for structural adjustment programs (SAPs).  SAPs are 
programs  implemented  in  developing  countries  by  the  international  financial  institutions  (IFIs, 
primarily the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).  In return for loans (or more recently, 
the forgiveness of loans) countries are expected to adopt a series of political and economic changes 
demanded by the IFIs.   These changes are intended to bring developing countries in line with the 
neoliberal economic policies of the Western industrial powers, such as the U.S. and Britain.  They 
typically involve things such as the reduction or elimination of tariffs, privatisation of state provided 
services such as health care and utilities, and financial deregulation.  The SAPs have been disastrous in 
Nicaragua, as they have been in other places where they were implemented.  While Nicaragua managed 
to avoid having to implement them through the 1980s because the Sandinistas were able to rely on the 
172 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Results of International Debt Relief, with Case Studies of Bolivia, Jamaica, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia." IOB Evaluations No.292. The Hague: Policy and 
Operations Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), 29.
173 See CIDA, Annual Report 1985-86, 79 and Annual Report 1986-87, 103.  No other year between 1978 and 1991 lists 
any debt repayments on the part of Nicaragua.
174 CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, lists loans of $7.5 million, $10.4 million, and $5.04 million.  See pages 25 and 56.
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Soviet Union for loans, they became quite damaging once Violetta Chamorro and the UNO came to 
power and the IFIs began lending to Nicaragua.  In  Sharing Our Future, CIDA stated that Canada 
supported SAPs and that lending was to be designed around them.175  Joe Clark articulated his support 
for some of the main tenets of structural adjustment in the House of Commons, saying that the best 
ways to boost productivity in the developing world were by stabilising the price of goods, lowering 
tariff barriers, and increasing capital flows and technology transfers to developing nations.176  The main 
goal  of  SAPs  is  to  force  developing  countries  to  adopt  policies  that  are  beneficial  for  industrial 
economies and not their own.  This is another clear instance of Canada supporting a policy which was 
more beneficial to Canadian industry than to Nicaraguan development.
During this  period,  Canada was keen to use its  aid  policy to position itself  within the UN 
system.  It is seen as being in Canada's interests to have a strong international system, as Canada is not 
powerful enough to push for its interests on the international stage without allying itself with similar 
powers.  This is especially true given how geographically isolated Canada is from the rest of the world, 
except for its superpower neighbour, the United States.  Throughout CIDA's documents on aid during 
this period, one finds frequent reference to United Nations projects, and how Canada's own policies fit 
within them.  CIDA's Annual Report for 1978-79 does this on a number of occasions.  Further, Mark 
MacGuigan attempted to position Canada as a strong supporter of the UN system in his introduction to 
CIDA's 1979-80 Annual Report.  The 1985-86 Annual Report discusses Canada's increased focus on its 
development programs on women, explaining that this  was in accordance with the United Nations 
Decade for Women.177  This focus on fitting Canada within an internationally recognised multilateral 
system can also be seen in Canada's approach to the peace process in Central America,  as will be 
illustrated  in  the  next  chapter.   These  policies  also  helped  lend  Canada's  programs  legitimacy by 
175 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 4 and 57.
176 Joe Clark. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (December 19, 1977), 2006.
177 CIDA, Annual Report 1978-79, 1979-80, 1985-86.
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associating them with non-partisan, internationally respected organisations.
Statements made by Canadian officials shortly after the Sandinistas came to power confirm that 
Canada's primary interests in Nicaragua were seen as domestic and not humanitarian.  In 1980, Mark 
MacGuigan, while Secretary of State for External Affairs, declared that Canada's aid was a matter of 
"enlightened self-interest".178  He also believed that one of Canada's development goals should be to 
help Canada form a separate identity from the United States.179  Canada's policies in Nicaragua were 
designed to show independence from the United States to some degree, though this was more the case 
under the Mulroney government than that of Pierre Trudeau.   This was important domestically,  as 
Canadians are always keen to see themselves as being different from the U.S.  It was also important in 
this particular instance because there was such considerable pressure placed on the government to act 
out against, and even criticise, U.S. policy in the region.  Once the Progressive Conservatives came to 
power, Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney were also personally interested in convincing others that Canada 
was capable of an independent foreign policy, perhaps as a counterweight to the perception in some 
circles that Mulroney was drawing Canada too close to the United States.  Continuing to give aid to 
Nicaragua without fundamentally challenging the position of the United States, was an effective way to 
try to play to both sides at once without rocking the boat too much in either direction.
Canada's ambassador to Costa Rica (also responsible for Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras) 
made the  link  between domestic  politics  and  aid  even  more  explicit.   Discussing  the  situation  in 
Nicaragua  with  the  Sub-Committee  of  the  Standing  Committee  on  External  Affairs  and  National 
Defence in 1982, he declared that Canada's primary motivation for giving aid to Nicaragua should be to 
increase Canada's  commercial  opportunities in the region.   He declared that  "Aid,  in a sense,  is  a 
prelude to trade."  He went on to describe the way that he anticipated this occurring; Canada would be:
identified with helping them out.  We are identified with providing certain types of equipment.  
178 CIDA, Annual Report 1979-80, 7.
179 CIDA, Annual Report 1979-80, 4.
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When needs  arise  because  they are  insolvent,  they will  turn  to  us,  or  at  least  look at  us  
favourably, in terms of supplying that equipment.180
The goal was to provide "certain types of equipment" with which Canada could be identified.  These 
types of equipment were, of course, those which Canada had a particular desire to export, such as in 
1983-84, when Canada extended a $13 million line of credit to Nicaragua for the purchase of Canadian 
agricultural equipment, fertilizers, and cows.181  Helping the Canadian agricultural industry was one of 
the chief goals of the aid policy during this period.  Liberal MP Yves Caron stated in 1978 that food aid 
was an excellent way for the government to help Canadian farmers, and not necessarily people in the 
developing world).182  This policy continued throughout the 1980s.  While the Tory government agreed 
to increase the amount of untied aid in general in 1987, it made no changes to the policy of requiring 95 
percent of all food aid (primarily wheat) to be tied.183
The Early Years of Sandinista Rule
When the Sandinistas took power July of 1979, while Canadian unions and church groups were 
quick to organise in support of the new Nicaraguan government, the federal government took a much 
more cautious approach.  It recognised the Sandinistas as the legitimate government of Nicaragua on 
July 24, just days after they took control of the capital city of Managua,184 but was not forthcoming 
with aid for the country, which had been seriously damaged in the course of the civil war that brought 
the FSLN to power.  On October 12 of that year, Pauline Jewett criticised the government for its slow 
response to what had been occurring in Nicaragua.  At that point, the government had provided no aid, 
except for aircraft for five flights to deliver $400,000 worth of privately raised aid, which had come 
180 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada's Relations with Latin  
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181 CIDA, Annual Report 1983-84, 19.
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primarily from the labour movement.185  A few weeks later, another member of the NDP, Bob Ogle, 
introduced a motion requesting "[t]hat this House instruct the government to make Nicaragua a country 
of  eligibility  for  bilateral  aid  through  CIDA,  to  review  its  priorities,  and  to  provide  the  needed 
assistance to Nicaragua."  The motion failed to receive the unanimous consent it required to be adopted, 
however.186  
It should be noted that while Nicaragua was not officially declared a country of eligibility for 
CIDA aid at this time, and while the Conservatives were slow to react, the federal government did in 
fact provide some aid around the time of the revolution.  In 1978-79, Canada provided $185,000 in 
relief for "civil conflict" in Nicaragua, and provided another $170,000 for the same purpose in 1979-80. 
A further $146,000 was provided that  year  for "post-war help" and "protection of civilians during 
conflict".  All of this money came out of the emergency relief budget, and thus did not require that 
Nicaragua be officially declared a country of eligibility for bilateral aid.187  The CIDA report for 1979-
80  also lists an additional      $200,000 in aid given that year, but does not specify its purpose.188  The 
Conservatives were being cautious at first, providing relief for civilians affected directly by the war, but 
not committing to any of the Sandinistas' development goals, as the church and labour movements had.
When the Trudeau Liberals were returned to power in 1980, their approach was similar to that 
of the Conservatives.  By 1981 they had changed their tune somewhat.  They were still critical of the 
Sandinista regime and they had not taken a clear position in regards to American actions in the region 
but they did begin providing some aid to Nicaragua.  The NDP continued challenging the Liberals to 
provide stronger support for the new regime in Nicaragua.  NDP MP Ray Skelly told the House of 
Commons that Canada should volunteer to help in Nicaragua's ground-breaking health and literacy 
projects, the two projects at the heart of the Sandinistas early development efforts.  Skelly said that by 
185 Pauline Jewett. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (October 12, 1979), 141.
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doing this, Canada would help Nicaragua recover more quickly from its civil war, which would lead to 
earlier  elections  and  prevent  "more  extremist  forces"  from  entering  into  the  country's  political 
system.189 MacGuigan, however, was trying to keep his distance from the ongoing problems in Central 
America.  He responded to Skelly by saying that Canada had no special  expertise or capability in 
Central American affairs, and that Canada's interests (by which he meant commercial ties) in Central 
America were not as great as they were in other parts of Latin America, such as Mexico, Venezuela, or 
Brazil.  The minister told Skelly that Canada had no greater obligation in Central America than did any 
other state, and thus would not take a leading role in the region.190
For the remainder of their time in office, they provided mostly food aid rather than project aid 
or technical assistance.  The Globe and Mail reported in June 1981, nearly two years after the FSLN 
had  come  to  power,  that  the  government  had  approved  $15  million  in  food  aid  to  be  sent  to 
Nicaragua.191  However, this $15 million was never provided, as there is no mention of it in CIDA's 
Annual Report.  The food aid listed for Nicaragua for 1981-82 is $4.48 million, not $15 million.192  This 
lines up with what MacGuigan told the House of Commons on November 25, 1981, when he said that 
Canada would be providing $4.5 million in food aid to Nicaragua.193  The following year, however, no 
food aid was provided.  Then in 1983-84, $2.82 million in food aid was sent.  This went along with 
$170  000  in  technical  assistance  to  Nicaragua  in  1981-82  (the  first  non-food  or  emergency  aid 
provided), $590 000 in technical assistance in 1982-83, and $710 000 in technical assistance in 1983-
84.194  
Other publications discussing Canada's role in Central America at the time typically combine all 
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of Canada's aid to Nicaragua into one figure.195  This is somewhat misleading.  When one excludes food 
aid, the amount given to Nicaragua between the revolution in 1979 and the end of the Liberal regime in 
1984 is just $1.79 million, far less than the several million per year often reported.  Food aid was 
uncontroversial, and was intended primarily to benefit Canadian farmers, not Nicaraguans.
The Liberals also provided Nicaragua with some loans toward the end of their time in office.  A 
$13  million  line  of  credit  was  extended  in  1983-84  for  the  purchase  of  Canadian  agricultural 
equipment, fertilizers, and cows,196 again intended primarily to benefit Canadian farmers.  A further 
$3.63 million in other unspecified loans were also provided that year.197  The only significant amount of 
money provided by the Liberals that was actually intended primarily for the benefit of Nicaraguans was 
the $3.16 million provided to Canadian NGOs to continue their work.198  This money was provided on a 
matching basis, where the NGOs first had to raise their own, following which Ottawa would provide 
supplementary funding.199  However, CIDA was accused of holding up some of this money on political 
grounds, despite repeated claims made in Parliament by the government that aid was not contingent 
upon politics.  While the federal government refused to get involved in Nicaragua's literacy campaign, 
the Canadian public did.  Two Protestant churches had raised money to contribute to the campaign, and 
had been granted matching contributions from CIDA, only to to have the money held up due to fears 
within CIDA that the Sandinista literacy project was being corrupted by the "Cuban influence" and 
"indoctrination".200  This was a pattern which held long after the federal government had publicly stated 
it did not believe these were problems.
Spending on aid,  particularly to  Central  America,  was  up on the  whole during  this  period. 
195 North's Between War and Peace in Central America and Lemco's Canada and the Crisis in Central America both do 
this, for example, and CIDA's own publications conflate the figures at times.
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MacGuigan noted that in the period between 1972 and 1981, Canadian aid to Central America had been 
$60 million,  mostly to El Salvador and Honduras,  the two poorest countries in the region.201  The 
amount of aid given to the region continued to rise during the rest of the decade.  A large part of the 
reason for this was public opinion.  In 1978, only 59 percent of the Canadian public supported Canada's 
foreign aid program.  That number stayed low into the 1980s.  In subsequent years, the following 
percentage  of  Canadians  supported  providing  official  development  assistance  (ODA):  65  percent 
(1979), 67 percent (1980), 64 percent (1981), 67 percent (1982).  However, the number shot up shortly 
after that.  In 1983, 81 percent of Canadians supported providing ODA, and that number stayed high 
until roughly mid-decade, before falling back into the low 70s in the latter part of the decade.202  There 
are likely two reasons for the major change in public opinion over ODA.  The first is that there was a 
major recession in the early 1980s and most Canadians were likely more concerned about conditions in 
their own communities than in those elsewhere.  By 1983, the economy had started looking better, and 
Canadians were more willing to pay attention to the troubles of people elsewhere.  The other reason is 
the Ethiopian famine, which saw widespread media coverage and was a  cause célèbre in 1984 and 
1985.  This culminated in the creation of Band Aid and the Live Aid concert, bringing considerable 
public attention to the plight of much of the Third World.  However, once these events faded from view 
public opinion was no longer as supportive of ODA.  Nicaragua was able to benefit from this push 
between 1983 and 1985,  as  both  the  public  and the  government  provided  Nicaragua  with  greatly 
increased funding (or loans) in comparison to previous years.
One of the most frequent criticisms of Canada's policy in Central America at this time was that 
Canada's presence in the region was not large enough.  It may have made sense in previous decades, 
when Canada's contacts were not extensive, for the embassy in Costa Rica to be responsible for other 
nearby countries.  However,  by  the  early  1980s  when  Canada  had  significant  aid  programs  in  El 
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Salvador and Honduras, and was beginning to develop an aid program in Nicaragua, one embassy for 
four countries seemed to be too small  a presence to fully handle all of Canada's obligations.  The 
embassy in Costa Rica was understaffed in 1982, with only 22 employees.  By contrast, the Colombian 
embassy had 43.203  This was in keeping with Canada's general practice to focus its international efforts 
on trade, rather than aid.  Money was spent where there was money to be made.
Because Canada's diplomatic representation in Central America was so light, it was difficult to 
accurately assess the needs of the region.  Indeed, Canada had less diplomatic representation in the 
region than Britain, France, West Germany, or even Japan, all of whom had embassies in more Central 
American countries than Canada did.204  This was despite the fact that Canada had a more significant 
aid  program in the region.   Canada was also a significant  contributor  to the Office of the United 
Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) in the region.  Because of the limited staff stationed 
there, however, Canada was unable to determine the extent of the refugee problem, and how it could 
help most constructively.  
In the aftermath of Nicaragua's civil war, Margaret Mead of the NDP criticised the Liberals for 
ignoring the needs of refugees from Nicaragua.205  MacGuigan's response to the refugee issue was not 
to attempt to determine the full scale of the problem or how Canada could help, but to hide behind the 
banner  of the UN.  In response to suggestions that  Canada should be doing more to help Central 
American refugees in Honduras and Nicaragua, MacGuigan avoided answering the question directly 
and instead stated that Canada was the third largest donor to the UNHCR in Central America and also 
gave to the International Committee of the Red Cross, implying that Canada should not be expected to 
do anything for  the refugees  itself,  such as accepting more of  them into Canada.206  This  fit  with 
Canada's  tendency  to  frame  its  international  policies  within  a  multilateral  framework,  using 
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organisations like the United Nations to provide legitimacy.  It allowed Canada to provide some aid to 
Nicaragua while not directly challenging the position of the United States.  Canada's position was that 
it was not supporting any particular regime, movement, or people; instead, it was supporting strong 
international institutions, which were seen as important to its own interests.  
When MacGuigan was questioned about the possibility of sending Canadians to Honduras to 
investigate accusations of refugee abuse, he responded by claiming that Canada had no authority to 
investigate anything in Central America.207  But there was no reason that Canada could not have a 
greater  presence  in  the  region  which  would  have  provided  the  government  with  a  considerably 
increased base of knowledge to work from.  If there was an embassy in Nicaragua or Honduras, the 
staff stationed there would have been in an excellent position to provide the government with a much 
clearer picture of the situation in the region, and the government could have used that information to 
inform its policies.  But the Liberals were determined not to get involved in the region outside of the 
regular contributions made to multilateral institutions; MacGuigan had gone on record several times 
saying that Canada did not have any interests in Central America and had no particular reason to get 
involved, despite ongoing pressure placed by the Canadian public.
The Liberal  government (and to a lesser extent the Tory government after  them), were also 
criticised for providing more aid to Honduras than to Nicaragua.  The government's critics believed that 
Nicaragua had undergone a democratic revolution and was worthy of the full support of the Canadian 
government, while Honduras had a worse human rights record and was not as worthy of support.  It 
was certainly true during the first year of Sandinista rule that Honduras received considerably more aid; 
for 1979-80, CIDA provided Nicaragua with just $200,000 in aid (not including emergency relief), 
while providing Honduras considerably more - $4.6 million.208  This was a pattern that continued for 
207 Mark Macguigan. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (April 7, 1982), 16256.
208 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Annex 1, "Breakdown of CIDA 
Bilateral Expenditures by Country."
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the duration of the Trudeau government: in 1981-82, Canada provided Nicaragua with $170,000 of 
bilateral aid; in 1982-83, $590,000; and in 1983-84, $710,000.209  By contrast, in those years Honduras 
received  $3.2  million,  $4.8  million,  and  $3.2  million.210  On  the  other  hand,  Nicaragua  received 
considerably more food aid than did Honduras during this period.  Part of that, certainly, was because 
Nicaragua had undergone a civil war and was in serious need of food.  But it is also a reflection of the 
way that the political situation shaped the delivery of aid.  Honduras was a "safe" country to provide 
bilateral aid to, while Nicaragua was not.  Honduras had a right-leaning government that was obliging 
to the requests of the United States, while Nicaragua was frequently accused of being run by Marxists 
who  were  trying  to  export  revolution.   The  Liberals  could  give  aid  to  Honduras  without  risking 
upsetting any other powerful country, the media, or the business community.  The only people likely to 
be offended were those on the left who held relatively little influence.  On the other hand, support for 
Nicaragua - despite widespread public approval - would have risked angering many of the groups on 
whose support the Liberals relied.
Aid During The Mulroney Years
When  the  Progressive  Conservatives  came  to  power  in  1984,  much  of  CIDA's  aid  policy 
remained unchanged.  While many individual members of the Conservatives still  expressed serious 
misgivings about the government of Nicaragua's intentions, Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney both seemed 
to accept that the Sandinistas were not a security concern.  This should not be too surprising.  Clark 
was Prime Minister when the Sandinistas came to power in the summer of 1979, and that government 
was the one to recognise the legitimacy of the Sandinista government almost immediately after they 
had come to  power.   He was also on record many times saying that  he believed the problems in 
209 CIDA, Annual Report 1983-84, 52.
210 North, 100.  It is worth noting that North's numbers do not quite line up with the CIDA Annual Report numbers for 
Nicaragua, so the numbers provided for Honduras may be off by a bit as well.  Nevertheless, the difference between the 
aid provided to Nicaragua and Honduras is quite wide, even after accounting for some discrepancies.
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Nicaragua were economic (North-South) and not political (East-West).211  
Opposition to this  viewpoint  existed not just  within the Conservative party,  but  also within 
CIDA as well, which constrained the government's ability to provide aid to Nicaragua.  In 1985 Tory 
MP Alex Kindy reported that CIDA staff had told him "[t]he agency is concerned about the human 
rights situation in countries such as Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Nicaragua" even though all three countries 
were receiving ODA.212  Even by the end of the Sandinista regime's time in office, CIDA documents 
were  still  calling  Nicaragua  an  undemocratic  country.   When Violetta  Chamorro  and the  National 
Opposition Union came to power in 1990, CIDA's Annual Report remarked that "[w]ith the election of 
President Chamorro in Nicaragua, all the countries in Central America enjoy democratically elected 
governments."213  These remarks on the part of CIDA officials are curious given that Nicaragua under 
the Sandinistas had experienced a much more open and pluralistic government than, say, El Salvador or 
Honduras, who did not come under nearly the same level of scrutiny.  The remarks are also strange 
given that both the Liberals and the Conservatives had recognised the democratic legitimacy of the 
FSLN.  CIDA's published documents over this period were more supportive of right-leaning, even 
authoritarian regimes than left-leaning regimes like Nicaragua.
The record of aid to Nicaragua under the Mulroney regime is mixed.  Nicaragua was always a 
recipient of some degree of bilateral aid during the time the Tories were in power.  The money provided 
during the first few years of the PC government was primarily in the form of loans.  Some money was 
also provided through direct bilateral aid, as well as through NGOs or multinational institutions.  In the 
latter part of the 1980s, once the government announced that all future aid would be in the form of 
grants rather than loans, direct aid to Nicaragua went up dramatically.  Prior to that, aid to Nicaragua 
went  up somewhat,  but  still  stayed  at  relatively low levels.   In  the  first  year  of  the Conservative 
211 See for example, Canada, House of Commons Debates on May 23, 1985, 5003 or January 28, 1986, 10244.
212 "CIDA's Policy Cautious on Human Rights Issues, MPs Told", Globe and Mail (May 17, 1985), P5.
213 CIDA, Annual Report 1990-91, 33.
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government, Nicaragua was provided $1.57 million in grants, double what the Liberals had given, but 
still a pretty small amount.  Loans also went up by a significant amount, from $3.6 million in the last 
year  of the Trudeau government  to  $5.04 million in the first  year of the Mulroney government.214 
Direct bilateral aid remained low for the next few years.  It fell to $1.02 million in 1985-86, and then 
was just $1.01 million in 1986-87.  Loans remained somewhat higher during this period; $5.06 million 
in 1985-86, and $2.89 million in 1986-87.215
While bilateral aid and loans continued roughly at the same level as they had at the end of the 
Liberal government, there are two noteworthy differences between the way their aid policies treated 
Nicaragua.  One is that, early on, the Progressive Conservatives were much less supportive of NGOs 
than the Liberals had been.  Aid to NGOs working in Nicaragua fell by half to $1.68 million during the 
first year of Tory government, then fell by half again the following year to $0.88 million the year after 
that, before rebounding to $1.63 million in 1986-87.216  While CIDA's reports do not list the reasons for 
decreased aid to NGOs, it seems unlikely that the change would have been due to decreased NGO 
activity.  Indeed, as was demonstrated in chapter 2, Canadian aid groups were extremely active during 
this period, and were raising a considerable amount of money to fund their operations in Nicaragua. 
There was ample opportunity for the government to provide matching funds, as was its policy.  It is 
unclear exactly why funding to NGOs in Nicaragua was so drastically reduced for those three years.
The other noteworthy change is that the Conservatives more or less stopped providing food aid. 
Between the time that the PC party came to power and the time the Sandinistas were voted out of 
office, the only bilateral food aid provided to Nicaragua by the Government of Canada was a $0.97 
million allotment in 1987-88.  No other year of Tory government saw Canada donate food aid of any 
amount, though small amounts of money (in the range of $100 000 to $200 000) were given to NGOs 
214 CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, 56.
215 CIDA, Annual Report 1985-86, 79 and 1986-87, 103.
216 CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, 56, 1985-86, 111, and 1986-87,137.
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to provide food aid during some years.  Some of the multilateral institutions to which Canada gave 
money did use Canadian money to purchase food aid, though this multilateral  aid was itself  much 
smaller than the food aid provided under the Liberal government.  Multilateral food aid went as high as 
$3.47  million  in  1987-88,  but  generally  hovered  around $1.5  million  per  year  between  1985 and 
1990.217  Much like the reduction in NGO aid, it is not entirely clear why food aid fell so dramatically. 
Food security was a problem throughout the time that the Sandinistas were in power.  Farms were a 
constant target for Contra troops, and they had been battlefields since the 1970s.
Another  change  that  occurred  under  the  Conservative  government  was  that  they  began 
providing loans for specific projects in Nicaragua.  Two of the largest were announced in their first year 
of government: a $7.5 million loan for the rehabilitation and construction of potable water systems, and 
a $10.4 million loan to help out with the production of the Momotombo II geothermal power station 
which  was  funded  jointly  by  several  countries.218  This  was  by  far  the  most  money provided  to 
Nicaragua by the Canadian government since the FSLN had come to power.  The combined total value 
of bilateral loans and grants extended to Nicaragua that year was $24.51 million, a significant amount 
of money.  However,  as was the case in previous years,  the majority of money being provided to 
Nicaragua was in the form of loans which they would eventually have to pay back, rather than grants. 
Just 6.5 percent of the money given to Nicaragua in 1983-84 was in the form of grants.  While the 
money loaned for potable water systems and power generation was undoubtedly valuable,  even as 
loans, given the country's tenuous situation with debt Canada's aid would have been far more beneficial 
for the long-term prospects of development if the money had been given as grants.  Providing loans 
was in keeping with the long standing policy of Canada, and especially the Tories, to treat international 
development as a business rather than a strictly humanitarian endeavour.  That topic will be dealt with 
in more detail later in this chapter.
217 All figures taken from CIDA's Annual Reports between 1985-86 and 1989-90.
218 CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, 25.
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After these two big-ticket items, little further funding was provided to Nicaragua over the next 
few years for specific projects.  CIDA's descriptions of its activities in Nicaragua tended to discuss the 
ongoing nature of those two large projects.  The further two years' reports both mention the potable 
water project as CIDA's biggest activity in Nicaragua.  However, the money was slow to be spent.  By 
1986,  only $1.6  million  worth  of  materials  had  been  purchased  and delivered  out  of  the  original 
allotment of $7.5 million.219  Because of this, it  may be unfair to include the loans as aid for any 
particular year, as they were spread out over the course of the projects, both of which were several 
years in duration.  While the official figures show much more aid given during 1984-85 than the next 
two fiscal years, because of the nature of the projects the money was more likely spread out over the 
course of several years. 
The next big item that the government loaned money for was the second phase of a dairy 
management project in 1987-88.220  CIDA's reports are unclear as to what the particular dollar amount 
of the project  was, however,  Joe Clark described the project  as Canada's major undertaking in the 
region.221  The following year saw Canada's biggest loan to Nicaragua yet - a $41.5 million line of 
credit for the creation and maintenance of potable water systems.222  Much like the money provided for 
potable water systems a few years prior, this money would have been given over the course of several 
years, and it is unclear if Nicaragua was able to take advantage of the full amount originally offered. 
That same year saw the Momotombo II generator come online, which at that point was providing 20 
percent of all of Nicaragua's energy.223  The potable water systems and the Momotombo generator were 
Canada's two largest contributions to development in Nicaragua during this period.
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), a Crown Corporation, was involved in 
219 CIDA, Annual Report 1985-86, 32 and 1986-87, 44.
220 CIDA, Annual Report 1987-88, 47.
221 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
222 CIDA, Annual Report 1988-89, 28.
223 CIDA, Annual Report 1988-89, 28.
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many small projects in Nicaragua at this time, and the focus of many of them was on ways to improve 
yields on small farms.  However, IDRC research was often hampered by the ongoing conflict with the 
Contras,  rendering research difficult,  if  not impossible to complete.224  CIDA was also involved in 
funding a fair  amount of smaller-scale research,  particularly research regarding the role of women 
(which became one of CIDA's areas of focus in 1987 after the release of Sharing Our Future).225  The 
bulk of funding, though, was directed towards the larger projects such as the geothermal energy plant 
and the dairy project.  Much like the decision to provide food aid made by the Liberals, these projects 
were  likely  chosen  because  they  were  politically  acceptable.   For  example,  cows  were  sent  to 
Nicaragua under both Liberal and Conservative governments, and this aid would have been difficult for 
critics to complain about.  On the other hand, the Tories opted not to take part in what were the two 
biggest and most important projects undertaken by the Sandinistas, which were their literacy campaign 
and  health  reforms.226  CIDA did  provide  some  funding  for  some  smaller  health  and  education 
projects,227 but the Canadian government never got behind either of those goals in a big way.  They 
were much more politically contentious.  The Tories played it safe, as the Liberals had, and gave money 
(and loans) primarily in areas that were difficult to object to, though the American government did try 
anyway.228
The government continued to come under attack for the amount of aid that it was providing 
Nicaragua, and the way in which it was doing so.  In March 1985, Pauline Jewett of the NDP continued 
224 Examples of this research include IDRC, "Rural Employment (Central America) Phase II" Project #800080, "Cropping 
Systems (Nicaragua) - Phase II" Project #800114, and "Female Agricultural Labour in Nicaragua" Project #850143, 
among others.
225 List of CIDA projects in Nicaragua between 1980 and 1989 provided to the author by CIDA.  Currently on file with the 
author.
226 Land reform was also very important for the Sandinistas, however, that was not really an area where international aid 
had much of a role to play, unlike health care and education.
227 See note 197.
228 The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in the Reagan regime claimed that Canadian aid was being 
used to fund the Nicaraguan military, and that the farms that Canadian aid was being used on were being used as military 
bases rather than for agricultural output.  However, these criticisms don't seem to have been taken very seriously.  "U.S. 
Official Attacks Canada's Foreign Aid 'Shoring Up' Nicaragua", Toronto Star (January 9, 1987), A14.
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to  press  the  government  to  do  more  for  Nicaragua,  complaining  that  the  aid  being  provided  was 
"paltry".   She was also concerned that the government had resumed giving aid to El Salvador -  a 
practice discontinued under Trudeau out of concern for human rights.  While the government claimed 
that the human rights situation in El Salvador was improving, it was still a serious problem.  Jewett 
wondered why the Conservatives were willing to support a country like El Salvador, with its troubling 
human  rights  record,  when  Nicaragua's  land  reform  and  literacy  programs  were  among  the  best 
examples in the developing world of a country improving the economic situation of its citizens.229  The 
multilateral institutions which Canada held in such high regard agreed.  Nicaragua's performance in the 
early 1980s was lauded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as “laying a 
solid foundation for long term socio-economic development”, while in 1986 UNICEF declared that 
Nicaragua had shown “one of the most dramatic improvements in child survival in the developing 
world”.230  Those  statements  are  quite  interesting  when  one  considers  that  the  U.S.  had  blocked 
Nicaragua from receiving loans from both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
once the Sandinistas had come to power.  That made it too risky for Canada to support Nicaragua's 
development policies, even though these powerful multilateral institutions would have provided some 
legitimacy.
The Tories were also criticised for continuing to support Honduras through the aid program 
when  Honduras  was  also  contributing  to  the  destabilisation  of  the  region.   Honduras  had  been  a 
recipient of aid long before Nicaragua; it was also one of the poorest countries in the region, so the 
government did have a legitimate claim to providing aid to them.  Dan Heap of the NDP was the chief 
critic of the government in this regard.  He suggested that Canada should use its aid programme to 
either pressure Honduras to stop allowing the Contras to use their territory as a staging ground for their 
training and attacks on Nicaragua,  or  else  shift  that  aid  to  Nicaragua.   He acknowledged that  the 
229 Pauline Jewett. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (March 12, 1985), 2946.
230 Chomsky, 98.
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Canadian aid programme on its  own could not  compete with the American aid programme, so he 
recommended that Canada should approach like-minded European countries to form a "consortium for 
peace"  that  could  collectively  provide  enough  money  to  counteract  U.S.  military  assistance  to 
Honduras.231  Jean-Guy Hudon, Clark's  Parliamentary Secretary,  responded to Heap by saying that 
"apparently the Hondurans have formally requested that the Contra forces leave their territory", and 
that Canada was concerned about Nicaraguan troops violating Honduran sovereignty by crossing the 
border in pursuit of Contra soldiers.232  This was part of an ongoing effort by some elements in the 
Progressive Conservative Party to cast the Sandinistas as violators of human rights and a threat to peace 
on the  same level  as  the other  countries  in  the region.   Heap pointed out  that  Honduras  was not 
attempting to get the Contras to leave, however.  They had turned over the Swan Islands and El Tigre to 
the United States to train Contras, they had provided access to air bases to the Contras, and they were 
sharing the El Agucate military base with U.S. troops and the Contras.233  Honduras was not only 
allowing the Contras to operate within their borders, it was actively aiding them.
Clark believed that it would not be helpful to cut off aid from Honduras.  Rather, he thought the 
correct approach was to increase aid to Nicaragua.  The position of the government was that there was a 
"Central American problem" that needed to be resolved which would not be adequately addressed by 
dealing with individual countries.  One of the reasons that aid was increased to Nicaragua was to help 
balance out the aid programme in the region.234  Due to Canada's role in the ongoing peace negotiations 
in the region, it was believed that Canada would best be able to contribute by acting as a neutral third 
party.   This required that  Canada not take the side of any particular  country,  as cutting off  aid to 
Honduras and shifting it to Nicaragua would have required.  However, Heap's suggestion would have 
provided  more support  to  Honduras,  not  less,  allowing  Canada  to  remain  supportive  of  all  five 
231 Dan Heap. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (January 20, 1987), 2501 and (September 1, 1987), 8683.
232 Jean-Guy Hudon. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (January 20, 1987), 2501.
233 Dan Heap. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (January 20, 1987), 2501.
234 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
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countries involved in the peace negotiations.  Clark later remembered that he was quite taken with 
Heap's analysis and that it helped guide some aspects of Canada's Central American policy.235
In 1987, CIDA underwent a review and released a major report detailing what the government's 
foreign aid priorities would be in the upcoming years.  This report was entitled Sharing Our Future:  
Canadian  International  Development  Assistance,  and  it  came  on  the  heels  of  a  Parliamentary 
Committee recommending new directions for Canada's ODA programme, as well as a response to the 
Parliamentary report on the part of the government.  It listed several priorities that it would use to focus 
its  programs;  programs  would  seek  to  alleviate  poverty,  emphasise  the  role  of  women,  promote 
environmental and ecological sustainability, strive for food security, and emphasise energy availability. 
They would also help design structural adjustments that would take into account the "human impact" of 
those they were meant to assist.236  The new priorities were a mix of the recognition of humanitarian 
goals and the government's desire to push an economic framework which would be beneficial to the 
industrialised nations on the developing world.  
Further to those guidelines, decisions on bilateral aid would be made each year in cabinet, and 
would be based on the following criteria: an individual country's needs; their commitment and capacity 
to manage aid effectively; the quality of the country's economic and social polices (or the willingness to 
improve them); Canada's political and economic relations with the country; the country's human rights 
record, and their commitment to involve their population in the development process.237  Nicaragua 
would have scored quite well on all of those measures, except that it did not have much of a history of 
political or economic relations with Canada.  It was certainly a needy country with a strong human 
rights record (relative to its neighbours), and the entire purpose of the revolution had been to involve 
the population in the development process.  Sharing Our Future also made clear what government 
235 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
236 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 4.
237 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 30.
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critics had been requesting for many years, as human rights violations were officially made a criteria 
that could be used to exclude a country from eligibility for bilateral aid (though no country would be 
barred  from emergency  aid  needed  as  a  result  of  natural  or  man-made  disasters).238  CIDA also 
announced that it would begin providing all ODA as grants rather than loans as had often been the case 
in the past.  CIDA did, however, continue to provide lines of credit for specific, large scale projects.
Nicaragua seems to have benefited from the new criteria as aid was increased notably in the 
years immediately following the release of this report.  In 1987-88, the amount of bilateral aid provided 
to Nicaragua skyrocketed to $9.22 million dollars, more than nine times the amount Managua had 
received the previous two years.  Bilateral aid remained high the next year, at $7.55 million, before 
falling to $2.54 million for the following year, which was still more than Nicaragua had received in any 
year prior to the release of Sharing Our Future.  Funding for NGOs working in Nicaragua also shot up, 
returning to the level they had been at the end of Trudeau's final term.  In 1987-88 Canada provided 
$2.53 million for  NGOs working  in  Nicaragua,  and  then  followed that  up with  $4.62 million the 
following year and $3.25 million the year after that.  Some degree of food aid was provided through 
multilateral institutions as well, including $3.47 million in 1987-88, though the government continued 
not to provide any bilateral food aid.239  While CIDA documents do not reveal the reason for this large 
jump in aid, the most probable explanation is that it was a reward for Nicaragua's participation in the 
peace negotiations which Canada was heavily involved in.  Nicaragua was widely lauded for being the 
most consistent in upholding its end of the agreements in these ongoing negotiations; the Parliamentary 
Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America noted that Nicaragua was the only Central 
American country whose National Reconciliation Commission was both active and forceful,240 while a 
representative for the Canadian Council of Churches informed Parliament that Nicaragua was the only 
238 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 28, 30.
239 Figures from CIDA, Annual Reports, 1987-88 to 1989-90.
240 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, Supporting the Five, 14.
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Central American country working towards full compliance with the  Esquipulas II Agreement.241  It 
seems as though Nicaragua was being rewarded for its attempts to live up to the agreements Canada 
had helped to broker.
Ottawa was still under pressure to open up an embassy in Nicaragua, since by 1986 there was 
only  one  fully  functioning  embassy  in  Central  America.   In  February  1986,  Jean  Chrétien  told 
Parliament that he thought Canada should open up an embassy in Nicaragua, which is curious given 
that the Trudeau government in which Chrétien was a cabinet minister repeatedly resisted requests to 
do the same thing.  Joe Clark responded by saying that he thought Canada's money was better spent 
providing aid directly to Nicaragua, and that there was no need for an embassy.242  The estimated cost 
to open up an embassy in Nicaragua was about $1 million, with an expected operating budget of $800 
000 per year thereafter.243  A Toronto Star article was critical of the government's refusal to open up an 
embassy  in  Managua,  citing  it  as  evidence  that  the  government  was  being  less  helpful  than  it 
claimed.244  The release of Sharing Our Future in 1987 saw the announcement that four new regional 
field offices would be opened to assist with the delivery of Canada's aid program.  However, none of 
these were in Latin America, let alone Nicaragua.245
Criticism came from within Parliament as well, when a committee consisting of Liberals, New 
Democrats, and Progressive Conservatives recommended that Canada should have embassies in all five 
countries in the region, and if that was not possible, that at the very least there should be a  charges 
d'affaires.246  The advice was not  taken.  The government  did eventually relent  somewhat  with the 
announcement in 1988 that aid offices were to be opened in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador in 
241 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 2:8.
242 Joe Clark. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (February 11, 1986), 10683.
243 Missing Central American Links", Globe and Mail (September 25, 1982), P15.
244 "Nicaragua: Is Canada Living Up To Its Word? Critics Say Ottawa Is Nt, And Our Image Is Suffering", Toronto Star 
(December 27, 1986), B5.
245 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 4.  The four regional field offices were to be located in South Africa, the Sahel, the 
Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.
246 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, Supporting the Five, 34, 37.
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order  to ensure that  Canada's  aid  programme had a  physical  presence,247 and later  that  year  Clark 
announced that an honorary consulate would be opened in Managua.248 It was not clear, however, at 
what level they would be funded or staffed, and they fell well short of the full embassy status critics 
had been calling for.  This was also part of the government's strategy to ensure that no special treatment 
was given to  any particular  country.   While  government  critics had primarily been pushing for an 
embassy in Nicaragua, aid offices were opened in all three countries in the region where Canada lacked 
a physical presence.
As was discussed earlier, Canada's aid programme to Nicaragua in many instances was intended 
to provide benefit to Canadians rather than Nicaraguans.  One of the chief manifestations of this was 
that Canada's international development policy had for a long time been guided by attempts to push a 
particular  capitalist  vision  of  economics  in  the  international  community.   This  attitude  was  more 
prevalent under the Progressive Conservatives than it had been under the Liberals, but it was present in 
governments led by both parties.
Joe Clark,  while  discussing Central  American policy in 1977, had put forward a neoliberal 
understanding of the issues being faced in Central America.  He claimed that "low productivity" was 
the cause of underdevelopment.  If countries like Nicaragua could lower tariffs, increase capital flows, 
and  improve  technological  transfers,  they  would  find  that  development  would  occur  much  more 
easily,249 despite the fact that virtually no country had ever developed by following that kind of path.  It 
has been far more frequent for capital flows to increase as a result of development rather than to cause 
it, and even highly industrialised countries such as Canada and the United States heavily protect certain 
industries to guard them from competition, as for example when Canada restricted Nicaraguan beef 
imports  after  lobbying  from Canadian  farmers.   And  while  "low  productivity"  may  have  been  a 
247 Joe Clark. "Report of the Special Committee of HC on Central America." in Arthur E. Blanchette, ed. Canadian 
Foreign Policy: 1977-1992, Selected Speeches and Documents. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 25.
248 Stevenson, 7.  There is still no full embassy in Nicaragua as of August 2009.
249 Joe Clark. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (December 19, 1977), 2006.
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problem, wide-scale repression of workers, intimidation of unions, and exploitation by domestic and 
international companies were certainly just as important.  Labour rights and public goods, however, 
were not part of Clark's proposal to improve living conditions in Central America.
During the events leading up to and shortly after the Sandinistas took power, Canadian embassy 
staff in Costa Rica were concerned that the incoming government was too left-wing.  Some of the 
leading Sandinistas were described as "doctrinaire Marxists" while Daniel Ortega, it was thought, "may 
also lean toward the Marxist."  Embassy staff were concerned about this.  They praised one member of 
the coalition, Alfonso Robelo for his business connections, but worried that he would be isolated in the 
new government and that left-wing concerns would take precedence.  What did Canada really want?  A 
"moderate centrist regime composed of liberal elements and other Christian democratic groups".250  A 
regime that was too far to the right would be difficult to support due to public pressure.  A regime on 
the  left  was  troublesome because  it  held  different  ideas  about  what  development  meant  and  how 
economics  should  be  handled.   Therefore,  a  regime  closer  to  the  right  but  less  distasteful  to  the 
Canadian public, and which would respect business interests but wasn't too authoritarian, was the ideal 
option.
CIDA documents during the late 1970s and early 1980s show that business interests were held 
to be important within the development agency as well.  One report notes that Canadian businesses had 
been allowed to attend the Inter-American Development Bank's annual Board of Governor's meeting in 
Vancouver, where they had asked about having improved access to Latin American markets.  This is 
quite interesting given that the purpose of the IADB is supposed to be to lend money to Latin American 
countries for the purpose of development.  It is not supposed to be an organisation for North American 
businesses, but for Latin American development.  The same report explains that most of Canada's aid 
programme is in fact not implemented by the government, but the private sector.251  Aid is big business.
250 McFarlane, 157.
251 CIDA, Annual Report 1978-79, 13.
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While neoliberal economic goals have been present in Canada's civil service and aid programme 
for some time, the emphasis placed on them was much greater under the Mulroney government than it 
had been under  the Trudeau government.   According to  Monique Vezina,  Mulroney's  Minister  for 
External Relations, in places where aid had been successful it was usually because the private sector 
had "been allowed to play its proper role".  It was her belief that the private sector should play a larger 
role in development.252  At the time, many people on the political right believed that the main route to 
increased prosperity in the developing world was to create the proper conditions for investment; if such 
conditions could be created, investors would gain confidence and start heavily investing in developing 
economies.  This was merely theory, however, not fact as Vezina claimed.  In reality, economic growth 
nearly always precedes international investment and not the other way around.253
  While Vezina may have believed the private sector should play a larger role, NGOs delivered a 
large portion of Canada's aid under both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments.  In 1983, Canada 
provided a larger percentage of its ODA through NGOs than any other country in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) other than Switzerland did.254  The amount stayed 
at roughly 10 percent of Canada's total aid budget under both Liberal and Conservative governments in 
the 1980s.  On the other hand, the private side of aid picked up considerably as well.  In 1987, CIDA 
noted that Canadian businesses were more involved in Canada's aid programme than they had ever 
been.  In 1984, there were 3300 small and medium sized enterprises registered with CIDA.  By 1987, 
the number had skyrocketed to 5200.255  The number of large business registered was not revealed, but 
it was clear that Canadian businesses were very active in the aid industry.  Because some aid became 
252 CIDA, Annual Report 1984-85, 5.
253 For a discussion of the theory behind these proposals from a macroeconomic standpoint, see Paul Krugman. The Return 
of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: Norton, 2009, chapters 4 and 5.  For an explanation of how 
this theory actually gets the chronology backward, see Richard Kozul-Wright and Paul Rayment.  The Resistible Rise of  
Market Fundamentalism: Rethinking Development Policy in an Unbalanced World.  Zed Books: London, 2007.
254 CIDA, Annual Report 1985-86, 53.
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untied in 1987, Canadian businesses became less involved than they had been previously, but they still 
benefited from the large amount of aid which was still tied.
CIDA documents  in  later  years  also  reveal  a  focus  on  neoliberal  economic  goals.   Brian 
Mulroney,  in the introduction to  Sharing Our Future,  describes the Colombo Plan as the dawn of 
Canada's major involvement in international development.256  The intent of that plan was to use aid as a 
tool to promote capitalism and keep communism from spreading in Asia.  This helps make sense of 
Canada's involvement in Nicaragua, where some members of the government were concerned about 
Marxist influence.  Sharing Our Future reveals its neoliberal slant in other ways as well, such as the 
aforementioned support for structural adjustment.  It also stated that developing countries must produce 
goods and services to meet demand on international markets.257  Nicaragua's main goals were literacy, 
health reform, and land reform, not exactly the most marketable assets in a global marketplace, and 
Canada chose not to support those programs.  The aid programme was driven largely by Canadian 
interests, like having access to cheap commodities, and not by Nicaraguan interests like equitable land 
distribution.
In 1988, the House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America 
echoed the remarks made a decade earlier by Canada's embassy in Costa Rica, saying that one of the 
major problems in Central America was that "the political centre has not held or ever coalesced."258 
While this committee still saw the need for a government in Nicaragua that was friendly to Canada's 
economic interests, its advice offered a bit more nuance than many of the government's statements had, 
when it expressed concern that higher standards were being applied to what counted as democratisation 
in  Nicaragua  as  compared  to  the  other  Central  American  countries.259  The  difference  between 
Nicaragua and other governments was that the former's government was much less business friendly.
256 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 9.
257 CIDA, Sharing Our Future, 59.
258 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, Supporting the Five, 3.
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Clark made many statements in the House of Commons explaining that he viewed the problems 
in Central America as economic and not political.  However, at the end of the 1980s when a new long 
term strategy for Latin America was developed in Cabinet,  it  involved the promotion of two non-
economic goals - democracy and environmental protection - as well as the promotion of three goals in 
line with its economic goals - debt reduction, economic development, and international trade.260  While 
it is true that a good deal of the problems in Nicaragua (and across Central America) were economic 
issues, the government missed the real root of these problems.  
In  the  view  of  successive  Canadian  governments,  Central  American  economies  were  not 
sufficiently open to world markets  and were not producing goods and services which international 
markets demanded.  This was a view of the problem which promoted primarily the interests of Western 
businesses.  Cheaper commodities, the opening of the tourist industry, and access to Nicaraguan labour 
markets, all of which are elements of the SAPs that Canadian aid policy supported, would have clear 
benefits for Canadian corporate interests.  It is less clear that those policies would have had meaningful 
benefits for the people of Nicaragua.  
The real economic problem in Nicaragua was not a  market problem, however, but a  labour 
problem.  Nicaragua was not in economically poor shape because of closed markets, but because of 
exploitation of workers.  Canadian mining companies, in exchange for their support of the Somoza 
regime, had been permitted to use the National Guard to keep their operations union free.261  Further, 
the Somoza family held nearly two-thirds of all land in Nicaragua at the time of the revolution that 
brought the FSLN to power.262  These were injustices that  the Sandinista government was actively 
working to overcome, and the Canadian government would have been of much more use to the people 
of Nicaragua if its aid programme had supported those goals, rather than pushing for economic reforms 
260 CIDA, Annual Report 1989-90, 29.
261 McFarlane, 85.
262 Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada's Relations with Latin  
America and the Caribbean, 24:52.
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that were not necessary.  Indeed, if anything, Canadian aid policy was calling for a return to many of 
the policies of the Somoza days.  While some Canadian politicians were quick to point out that, unlike 
the Americans, they viewed the problems in Central America as being economic rather than political in 
nature, the focus of their economic critique was entirely based on market forces and not labour issues. 
The Canadian government was making an active effort to set itself apart from the United States, though 
in reality the policies that Canada promoted were very similar to what the U.S. wanted.  The difference 
was that Canada continued to push for them peacefully.
While Clark asserted that Canada did not have a preference in the 1990 elections which saw the 
Sandinistas lose power,263 CIDA documents as well as Canadian aid policy seem to indicate otherwise. 
Canada  very much  wanted  a  government  which  was  sympathetic  to  Western  business  interests  in 
power, and when one was elected, they reacted as one would have expected.  As was noted above, 
when Chamorro came to power, CIDA declared that now "all the countries in Central America enjoy 
democratically elected governments" despite the fact that Canada had long recognised the democratic 
legitimacy of the Sandinista government.   In the year following Chamorro's election,  CIDA aid to 
Nicaragua increased substantially.  A $5 million grant was provided for water sanitation projects, $11 
million was given for electrical energy infrastructure, and $4.6 million was given for "human resource 
development", while $7.72 million in unspecified grants was also provided.264  That adds up to $28.32 
million, nearly triple the amount given in 1987-88 (the previous record year for Canadian bilateral aid 
to Nicaragua) and more than ten times the $2.54 million given the previous year!  Canada was happy to 
use its aid policy to support a government that was more in line with Canadian economic objectives, 
and CIDA continued providing Nicaragua with large grants in subsequent years.
After the Chamorro government came to power and Canada had the "moderate centrist" regime 
it had been looking for for the past decade, the United States stopped obstructing loans to Nicaragua at 
263 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
264 CIDA, Annual Report 1990-91, 33, S50.
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the World Bank, and Nicaragua quickly built  up an enormous multilateral  debt,  which to this  day 
continues to pose serious problems for the prospects of development in the country.  In order to receive 
these loans Nicaragua had to agree to take part in the structural adjustments which Canada had been 
advocating, and was required to implement precisely the kinds of market reforms that the Canadian aid 
programme had been trying to push.  The results were, predictably, horrible for the social welfare of 
most of Nicaragua's citizens, as they have been in places across the world where SAPs have been 
implemented.265
Conclusion
Over  the  course  of  the  first  Sandinista  regime  (1979-1990),  Canada's  aid  policy  towards 
Nicaragua was reasonably consistent.  Neither the Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives had any 
interest  in  aligning  themselves  with  the  more  revolutionary aspects  of  the  Sandinista  government. 
Land  reform,  health  reform,  and  the  literacy  campaign  -  all  of  which  were  considered  to  be  of 
paramount importance by the FSLN - were never supported by the Canadian government, though they 
were frequently supported by the Canadian public through private aid organisations.  The Liberals were 
slow to respond to the Sandinistas, and most of the aid that they did provide was in the form of food 
aid.  To be sure, Nicaragua's agricultural capabilities were seriously damaged by the civil war that 
brought  the  Sandinistas  to  power,  and then by conflict  with the Contras  and the United States  in 
subsequent years, and food aid was needed.  Support for their social ambitions was also needed though, 
and the Liberals were unwilling to provide that through the aid program.  Neither were the Tories.  The 
265 For some examples of how the structural adjustment process has harmed the quality of life for Nicaragua's rural poor - 
who make up most of the country's population - see Boucher, Stephen R., Bradford L Barham, and Michael R Carter. 
"The Impact of 'Market-Friendly' Reforms on Credit and Land Markets in Honduras and Nicaragua." World 
Development, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2005), 107-128; Nigenda, Gustavo and Maria Helena Machado. "From State to Market: 
the Nicaraguan Labour Market for Health Personnel." Health Policy and Planning, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2000), 312-318; Jack, 
William. “Contracting For Health Services: An Evaluation Of Recent Reforms In Nicaragua.” Health Policy and 
Planning. Vol. 18, No. 2 (2003), 195-204; Deininger, Klaus, Isabela Lavadenz, and Eduardo Zegarra. “Determinants and 
Impacts of Rural Land Market Activity: Evidence from Nicaragua.” World Development. Vol. 31, No. 8 (2003), 1385-
1404.
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Progressive Conservative government  stopped providing virtually any food aid  and instead  shifted 
funding primarily to large infrastructure projects.  Because these were funded by loans and not by 
grants, Canada was actually providing less aid to Nicaragua in the early years of the Tory government 
than they had been under  the later  years  of  the Liberal  government.   Later  in  the decade,  after  a 
Parliamentary Committee had examined the issue and after Canada became more heavily involved in 
the  peace negotiations  in  the region,  the Mulroney government  stepped up its  aid  commitment  to 
Nicaragua, likely as a reward for what were seen as good faith efforts on the part of the Sandinistas to 
live up to their international agreements.
While Canadian aid sometimes contributed positively to Nicaragua in the 1980s through the 
provision of much needed food aid and funding for  several  key infrastructure projects,  it  was not 
always beneficial, and benefits for Nicaragua were not always the primary intent.  Canadian aid in 
Nicaragua, as elsewhere was often designed so that it would benefit Canadians.  The purpose of food 
aid was to provide a government supplement for Canada's wheat farmers, and the dairy projects in 
Nicaragua were chosen to help Canada's dairy farmers.  Aid was big business for the private sector as 
well - 5200 small and medium sized businesses were registered with CIDA in 1987, and it was these 
private corporations who were responsible for implementing an aid policy that in some years provided 
them with several million dollars.
Canadian aid was also targeted at promoting a specific set of economic values and policies that 
were seen as being in the Canadian interest, such as lower tariffs and financial deregulation.  These 
policies were primarily pushed through Canada's support for structural adjustment programs under the 
Mulroney government, though they were also a part of Canada's aid policy during the Trudeau years. 
These  neoliberal  reforms  would  eventually  be  implemented  in  Nicaragua  once  they  elected  the 
"moderate, centrist" government which Canada wanted, and they would prove to be disastrous.  Canada 
used its aid programme in Nicaragua to try to differentiate itself from the United States.  And while 
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Canada and the U.S. had very different approaches to the Sandinista government, they both ultimately 
wanted the same thing: a government which would be compliant with Western business interests.
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5
Searching For Peace In Central America
Aside from official development assistance, Canada's primary contribution to Nicaragua during 
the 1980s was through its involvement in the peace process that was ongoing throughout the decade, 
which occurred over two stages.  The first was the Contadora negotiations which had begun in 1983, 
and were made up of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.  They hoped to mediate the ongoing 
conflicts which were occurring in every Central American country except Costa Rica, and were seen as 
causing instability in Latin America as a whole.  Outside countries such as Canada and West Germany 
were brought in to help with the process as well.266  The Contadora process laid the groundwork for the 
more substantial stage of the peace negotiations, the Esquipulas negotiations.  Esquipulas was made up 
primarily of the Central American countries themselves, the idea being that they needed to take control 
of  their  own destinies  and could  not  rely  on  others  to  solve  their  problems  for  them.267  Canada 
remained  involved  in  roughly  the  same  capacity  as  it  had  during  the  Contadora  portion  of  the 
negotiations, providing advice primarily on areas related to border patrols and peacekeeping, which 
was seen as the area that Canada had the greatest relevant experience in.
The Liberals were quite reluctant to get involved in the peace process while MacGuigan was 
Secretary  of  State  for  External  Affairs,  though  their  position  opened  up  somewhat  once  Allan 
MacEachen took over the post.  The Conservatives became much more involved in the process, though 
it may be fair to say that they simply continued from what MacEachen had started towards the end of 
his tenure as Secretary of State for External Affairs.  While the Progressive Conservatives were in 
power,  there  were  several  occasions  on  which  Canada  provided  written  advice  to  the  Esquipulas 
countries on how they could design the security portion of their agreement, and Canadian delegations 
266Supporting the Five, 13.
267"Toward Peace In Central America." Toronto Star (February 22, 1986), B2.
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physically joined the negotiations a number of times as well.  Canada's involvement during this process 
is its clearest divergence from U.S. policy on Nicaragua.  The U.S. was committed to using violence to 
displace the Sandinistas,268 while Canada was committed to finding a negotiated solution to the region's 
instability.  This fit well with Canada's internationalist approach, as aid and criticisms of the American 
government  were  also  expressed  as  part  of  Canada's  commitment  to  a  multilateral,  cooperative 
international  framework.   However,  neither  the  Liberals  nor  the  Conservatives  were  prepared  to 
publicly  pressure  the  United  States  into  becoming  involved  in  the  peace  process,  which  made  it 
exceptionally unlikely that it could work, no matter what was agreed to.
MacGuigan set the tone that the debate about Canada's involvement in the peace process would 
take early on.  He declared that Canada had little in common with Central America, had few ties with 
the region, and had no special expertise or capability in Central American affairs.  Canada's interests 
there were not as great as they were in other Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, or 
Venezuela.  Further, Canada had no greater obligation than any other state did to resolve the conflicts in 
Central  America.269  MacGuigan  was  unwilling  to  get  involved  unless  Canada  had  some  sort  of 
historical or economic tie which could be used to justify involvement, and getting involved in Central 
American conflicts certainly did not seem to have any clear economic benefit for Canada.
The NDP tried to press the Liberals to get more involved in the peace process, to no avail.  Bob 
Ogle  requested  that  the  government  get  involved  in  the  "Mexico/Venezuela"  peace  initiative,  and 
protest to the U.S about its "destabilising interference".270  Charles Lapointe responded on behalf of the 
Liberals,  remarking  that  Canada  was  supportive  of  the  peace  process,  and  had  let  Mexico  and 
268 The U.S. was not necessarily intent on having the Contras literally overthrow the Sandinistas and take their place.  The 
main goal seems to have been to make the people of Nicaragua recognise that the U.S. would never support peace as 
long as the Sandinistas were in power, so that they would vote in a government more sympathetic to American financial 
interests.  Once the FSLN was voted out of power and the UNO took over, the U.S. did indeed stop funding the Contras 
and begin working with the new government on implementing a neoliberal economic framework for the country.
269 Mark MacGuigan. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (March 9, 1981), 8033-4.
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92
Venezuela know as much, but would not be getting directly involved.  He also said that the government 
would  use  private,  not  public  means  to  express  disagreement  with  the  Americans  on  this  issue.271 
Trudeau took the same stance.  When pressed by Ed Broadbent to take a larger role in the peace process 
and criticise American attempts to overthrow the Sandinistas, Trudeau indicated that Canada supported 
the implementation of an internationally verifiable peace agreement in Nicaragua, but would not be 
taking part directly.272  Much like their stance toward American interference in the region, the Liberals 
were willing to say that they supported peace, but were unwilling to take any concrete steps to help 
secure it.
In October 1983 an interesting incident occurred, one which would be oddly repeated when the 
Tories were in power a few years later.  External Relations Minister Jean-Luc Pepin told the press that 
Canada was prepared to send observers to Central America to monitor a peace deal if the Contadora 
countries could reach one.  On subsequent days, there was considerable back-tracking on behalf of the 
government, as other spokespeople let it be known that the government did not in fact have any plans 
to send troops into Central America.  Canada was willing, however, to listen to any requests that may 
have  eventually been  made by the  countries  involved.273  This  was  a  typical  response  under  both 
Mulroney and Trudeau: Canada was not willing to involve itself in the region, but if the region decided 
that Canada should be involved, Ottawa would be willing to consider it.  
Near the end of 1983, though, MacEachen did indicate that Canada was willing to formally 
support the Contadora process, and acknowledged that Canada might potentially give advice on the 
issues of arms control and border monitoring.274  This came shortly after Mexico's foreign minister 
formally requested a detailed briefing on Canada's experiences with peacekeeping, which the Liberals 
provided.  In June 1984, Canadian officials were asked to comment on the security and control aspects 
271 Charles Lapointe. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (December 1, 1982), 21168.
272 Pierre Trudeau. Canada, House of Commons Debates, (May 2, 1983), 25046.
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of an agreement-in-process known as the Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.  Canada 
provided  these  suggestions  to  Contadora  officials  on  August  23  of  that  year.275  These  would  be 
Canada's primary areas of involvement under the Progressive Conservative government as well.
A Broader Influence in the Region: Tory Support for Esquipulas
While the Liberals were generally reluctant but occasionally supportive of the peace process, 
the  Progressive  Conservatives  were  generally  supportive  but  occasionally  reluctant.   The  new 
government got more heavily involved in the peace process than the Liberals had, for a number of 
reasons.  The most obvious one is that the peace process was simply further along, and the countries 
involved had requested Canada's help, so there was a much larger area in which to manuever.  Clark 
and Mulroney also wanted to be seen as forceful and independent actors on the international scene,  and 
Nicaragua was one of the primary areas where they pursued this strategy.276  Another important reason 
for Canadian involvement on the part of the Tories was to advance Canada's influence in the region, 
especially with the larger countries such as Mexico, with whom there were more obvious economic 
benefits to an improved relationship.
Joe Clark seemed to be the Progressive Conservative most interested in having Canada become 
more involved in the peace process.  One of his first statements in regard to Nicaragua after being 
named  Secretary  of  State  for  External  Affairs  was  to  tell  the  House  of  Commons  that  his  party 
supported the Contadora process as the best chance for the region to obtain peace, noting that Canada 
had given advice to the Contadora countries about peacekeeping.277  This advice was likely given at the 
behest of the previous Liberal government, as the Conservatives had not been in power long when 
Clark made the comment.  But the difference between the cautious Liberal approach to Contadora and 
275 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, 8.
276 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
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the seemingly more open approach of the Tories was striking.  Shortly after Clark announced Canada's 
support for the process to the House, he suggested to Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela's 
ambassadors that Canada would be willing to send peacekeepers to the region, though the plan would 
require approval in Cabinet and the acceptance of all of the countries involved.278  However, External 
Affairs  spokespeople  insisted  that  Canada  had  made  no  such  offer,  and  had  no  plans  to  send 
peacekeepers to Central America.279  This was bizarrely similar to the situation that occurred under the 
Liberals when Jean-Luc Pepin told the press that Canada was prepared to send troops to monitor the 
region.  It is unclear exactly why this problem occurred under both governments, except that there were 
clearly disagreements  within  the  government  over  the  extent  to  which  Canada  was willing  to  get 
involved.
While Clark was the most vocal proponent of Canada's involvement in the peace process, his 
position on it was still somewhat reserved.  He told a reception for Peruvian Prime Minister Luis Alva 
that the conflicts in Central America could not be solved by outsiders, only by the Central Americans 
themselves,280  something he suggested in the House of Commons when describing Esquipulas: "[t]he 
initiative of the five Presidents is more than an attempt to resolve their own problems.  It is an assertion 
of their  own unique identity."281  Supporting the Five,  a report  written by the House of Commons 
Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, showed that there was support for this 
view in Parliament.  According to that report, it was "not for [the] international community to propose 
alternative agendas."282  This was true in a sense.  If the countries themselves were not committed to 
peace, it was unlikely that it could be achieved, and a negotiated regional settlement fit quite nicely 
with Canada's desire to support multilateralism.  But even if they were committed to peace, it would 
278 "Clark Urges Return of Peacekeeping Role", Globe and Mail (February 4, 1985), P4.
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still be virtually impossible to achieve if the U.S. continued destabilising the region.  Supporting the 
Five recognised this when it said that the chance for the Esquipulas II Agreement to succeed depended 
largely on U.S. support for it.283  This turned out to be quite accurate.  Peace was not achieved in 
Nicaragua  until  the  U.S.  stopped  providing  support  for  the  Contras  and  began  working  with  the 
Chamorro administration once the FSLN had been voted out of power.
According to John Graham, Canada's Director General for the Caribbean and Latin America at 
the time, a number of Canadian suggestions were in fact adopted by the Esquipulas countries.  The 
suggestions  that  Canada  made  were  primarily  about  the  design  of  the  Control  and  Verification 
Commission  (CVC),  the  peacekeeping  portion  of  the  agreement.   Canada  advised  on  the  need  to 
establish a controlling body to supervise the agreement; the need for guarantees related to freedom of 
movement; the need to clearly define the size, logistical, and communication support for the CVC; and 
the organisation of the financial operations of the CVC.  Canada also advised that the agreement not 
cover irregular or insurgent forces, since they were not party to the agreement.  It was also suggested 
that the CVC should be open to the media for purposes of transparency and accountability.284  From the 
Esquipulas II Agreement, however, it is difficult to tell exactly how Canada was able to influence the 
agreement, or how its advice was used.  The agreement deals primarily with elections and the National 
Reconciliation Commissions.  The entire section on the CVC says:
The governments of the five Central American States, with the Contadora Group Acting as  
mediator, shall continue negotiating on the points outstanding in the draft Contadora Act on  
Peace and Co-operation in Central America with regard to security, verification and control.
The negotiations shall also cover measures for disarming irregular forces prepared to avail  
themselves of amnesty decrees.285
283 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, 1.
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While the Central  American countries requested Canada's  advice on numerous occasions,  it  is less 
evident that they used that input to any concrete ends.
In April 1988, the Esquipulas countries again asked Canada for help.  This time Canada, along 
with  the  United  Nations,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (West  Germany),  and  Spain,  were 
informally asked to help set up the "verification and control follow-up machinery".286  In 1990 this 
finally came to fruition, when Canadian troops were involved in a United Nations peacekeeping force 
sent  to  the  region  which  also  included  West  German,  Spanish,  Irish,  Colombian,  and  Venezuelan 
peacekeepers.287  The United States, despite having key allies like Canada take part in the negotiations, 
were against them from the start and were not interested in seeing any agreement honoured if it allowed 
the Sandinistas to keep power.  The actions of the U.S. in Nicaragua have been seen as an extension of 
the Monroe Doctrine, which declares that the United States would view any interference by European 
states in the Americas as a threat requiring a military response from the U.S.288  However, it is clear that 
the U.S., not the U.S.S.R., was the destabilising force in the region, despite the attempts of successive 
Canadian governments to frame the issue as though both were equally to blame.  
While it may not seem at first glance as though there were any real benefits for Canada to get 
involved  in  the  peace  process  in  Central  America,  a  closer  examination  reveals  that  Canada's 
engagement was not entirely altruistic.  Perhaps the most obvious advantages for Canada related to two 
points already raised.  The first was that Canada would benefit from a co-operative, non-interventionist 
international system, which is necessary to protect it from being at the mercy of the larger powers, and 
also allows Canada to enjoy some influence over those powers that it might otherwise not; supporting a 
multilateral, negotiated settlement for Nicaragua helped show the usefulness of such a system.  The 
second point is that many Canadians would like to demonstrate that  the country is able to operate 
286 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, 13.
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outside of the influence of the U.S. and set an independent path; taking part in these negotiations was 
part of that, both in the way that Canada was able to show the differences between itself and the U.S., 
and also by nominally supporting other countries in their efforts to do the same.
There was another benefit for Canada which was perhaps more immediately important.  Canada 
was able to use the process as a way to assert its own influence in Latin America.  The primary country 
through which Canada was able to do this was Mexico.  It was Mexico's Foreign Minister who made 
the initial formal request for Canada to provide advice on peacekeeping when the Liberals were in 
power.   The  Mexicans  were  also  the  ones  who successfully  enticed  the  Progressive  Conservative 
government into the peace process.  Shortly after the Tories came to power, Clark went to Mexico, 
where the Mexicans raised the issue of Central America and complained that the U.S. was "not making 
it easier" to resolve the issues in the region; Mexico hoped that Canada would be able to help. The 
Tories had a good reason to get involved - Mexico was not a member of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs  and Trade at  the time.  They also did not trust  the Americans.289  Canada was in a unique 
position  to  influence  Mexico's  decision  to  more  formally  join  the  neoliberal  economic  order. 
According to Clark, Canada's involvement in Central America during the mid-to-late 1980s was also 
the issue that helped begin Canada's path to membership in the Organisation of American States, which 
it had up until that point resisted joining.290  Taking a position that was distinct from the U.S. on the 
issue of the Central American peace process allowed Canada to have more influence in the region than 
it had at any point in the past.
Conclusion
The Liberal government was reluctant to get involved in the peace process in Central America, 
as it had also been reluctant to criticise the United States or to provide any significant amount of aid to 
289 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
290 Interview with Joe Clark, Waterloo, ON, October 26, 2008.
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Nicaragua.  The Liberals originally gave the impression that they had no interest in being involved in 
the process, but by the end of their time in power they had begun providing advice to the Contadora 
group on one particular aspect of the negotiations, peacekeeping.  The Conservative government stayed 
involved in the peacekeeping portions of the negotiations and eventually did send peacekeepers to the 
region, and in Shaping the Five, further support was given to the view that Canada was well positioned 
to  give  advice  on  peacekeeping  on  the  basis  of  its  considerable  international  experience  with  the 
endeavour.291  The  idea  that  Canada  is  a  nation  of  peacekeepers  with  considerable  international 
experience in the field is more myth than reality,  though.  In truth, Canada has generally played a 
tertiary role in peacekeeping operations, and has rarely had large numbers of personnel (military or 
otherwise) involved.292  Canada may have had more experience with international peacekeeping than, 
say, Honduras, but its overall experience has not been nearly so great as Canadian politicians made it 
out to be.  It was, however, a useful way for Canada to become involved in the negotiations in Central 
America.
291 Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, 27.
292 See J.L. Granatstein  "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality" in J.L. Granatstein, ed.  Canadian Foreign 




Throughout  the  Sandinista  period,  Canada's  official  relations  with  Nicaragua  were  marked 
primarily by two traits.   The first  is  that  Canada refused to accept the American position that  the 
Sandinistas were a threat to hemispheric security and were not a legitimate government.  The second is 
that, despite the belief noted above, Canada refused to move too far outside of the American position. 
The  Liberals  adhered  to  Canada's  long-standing  tradition  of  recognising  popularly  supported 
governments,  but  did  little  to  support  the  new  regime  beyond  recognising  its  legitimacy.   The 
Progressive Conservatives went a bit further, providing a healthy amount of aid to Nicaragua in the 
latter part of the 1980s and becoming a visible and vocal participant in the peace process that continued 
in Central America throughout the decade in multiple forms, which culminated in the deployment of 
Canadian peacekeepers in the region.  But like the Liberals, the Conservatives were not interested in 
contradicting the Americans too frequently, loudly, or noticeably.
It was not Canada's official relations with Nicaragua, but the ones between citizens which were 
most noticeable, common, and forceful.  Within days of the FSLN taking over in Nicaragua, Canadian 
unions  were  raising  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  to  support  the  new  regime.   The  federal 
government,  which  took  a  few  years  to  begin  providing  aid  other  than  emergency  assistance  to 
Nicaragua, looked sluggish by comparison.  Over the next number of years, several new Canadian aid 
organisations were started in order to contribute to the cause, while older organisations such as Oxfam 
found that they took on new importance in light of the willingness of Canadians to give money, goods, 
and time to help out Nicaraguans.  By the middle of the decade,  Canadian aid organisations were 
providing millions of dollars a year to Nicaragua, more than any other Western nation and more some 
years than their government.  People from all across Canada contributed to the cause.  It did not matter 
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what part of the country they were from, what kind of employment they held, or what level of income 
and  education  they had;  a  wide  variety  of  Canadians  contributed  over  a  long stretch  of  years  to 
Nicaraguan development.  It was not merely the fashionable cause of the moment, as the Ethiopian 
famine became in 1984 and 1985, but a cause that many Canadians were genuinely and consistently 
involved in over the course of a decade, and in the case of some religious groups, even longer.  
However, Canadians did not just donate money.  They pressured their elected representatives to 
take  stronger  action.   MPs,  committees,  and  Cabinet  ministers  received  more  correspondence  on 
Central  America  than  virtually  any  other  foreign  affairs  topic.   Canadians  wrote  letters,  signed 
petitions, called their MPs, and made submissions to committees on topics such as the peace process in 
Central America and the direction of Canada's aid program.  The pressure placed on politicians to take 
a stronger stance on American action and Nicaraguan development was considerable, and it did help to 
get Canada more involved, even if the role that was played was not always the one that Canadians 
seemed to want.
Canada's relations with the U.S. were also an important factor in the equation, as they always 
are in the field of international relations.  The U.S. did not want the Sandinistas in power and was 
willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars over the course of the 1980s to try and have them run 
out of power by the Contras, claiming that the Sandinistas were a threat to hemispheric security and 
wanted to "export revolution".  The Liberals did not directly buy into these claims, but at the same time 
did not make much of an effort to diffuse them either.  Mark MacGuigan in particular seemed to be 
sympathetic to the American view and was much more critical of Nicaragua than were subsequent 
ministers.  The Progressive Conservatives were also careful not to offend Canada's neighbour to the 
south.  Brian Mulroney had come into office claiming he would improve Canada's relations with the 
U.S.,  and was not about to  disrupt that  goal.   Yet at  the same time, the Tories were more visibly 
opposed to the U.S. position, even though they did not do much to counter it.  Joe Clark made it clear 
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many times that Canada viewed the problems in Central America, including Nicaragua, to be the result 
of a North-South issue, one of economic development; the Americans viewed it as an East-West issue, 
one of ideological expansionism, but unlike the Liberals, who seemed unsure if they subscribed to that 
view  or  not,  the  Tories  rejected  it  outright.   There  were  definite  disagreements  within  the  party, 
however, as to whether or not that was an accurate assessment of the situation.  Some Tories were 
involved  in  fund-raising  for  the  Contras,  while  others  pushed  to  have  Canada  join  the  American 
embargo.  In the end, tradition and internationalism won out, and the Progressive Conservatives took a 
moderate path of being generally supportive of the Sandinistas while not taking any specific actions 
that were likely to seriously upset the U.S.
Canada's aid programme to Nicaragua during the 1980s fluctuated between non-existent and 
reasonably substantial.  During the first two years of the Sandinista regime, Canada provided virtually 
no bilateral  assistance.   For the last  couple years of Liberal  rule,  Canada did provide some fairly 
significant  food aid,  and  extended a  $13 million  line  of  credit,  getting  the  government  somewhat 
involved in Nicaragua alongside the Canadian public.  During the first couple of years the Tories were 
in office, aid to Nicaragua was relatively small.  After a review of Canada's foreign aid priorities, and 
once Canada became more fully involved in the Esquipulas process, aid to Nicaragua rose substantially. 
Canada's aid programme in Nicaragua was never altruistic, however helpful it may have been. 
The  aid  programme was  seen  as  pushing  a  number  of  important  goals,  such as  regional  stability, 
increasing Canadian business and trade opportunities, giving Canada a means to push the Sandinistas to 
keep to their pledges of political pluralism, and increasing Canada's influence and prestige on the world 
stage.   There  were  also  less  frequently  stated  goals  which  were  nevertheless  present  and  quite 
important.   CIDA documents  and  Canadian  diplomats  made  it  clear  that  what  Canada  wanted  in 
Nicaragua  was  essentially  what  the  U.S.  wanted  -  a  government  which  would  be  sympathetic  to 
Western business interests.  Canada's aid programme was supportive of the standard tenets of neoliberal 
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economics, and while the Liberals had this agenda to some degree, it was the Tories who really pushed 
it.   They supported  the  structural  adjustment  programs  which  have  had  destabilising  and socially 
destructive results throughout the developing world.  The people responsible for Canada's development 
programme, both within CIDA and within the Tory Cabinet, made it clear that they thought that trade 
and financial liberalisation, private enterprise, and market competition were what would help Central 
America develop.  The fact that aid to Nicaragua shot up dramatically as soon as the Sandinistas were 
replaced by a more pro-Western government, while CIDA celebrated the victory of Chamorro, is proof 
of what those in power in Canada felt their interests were.  
Because both the Tories and the Liberals saw the importance to Canada of maintaining a strong, 
non-interventionist international order, neither party had any interest in taking part in American actions 
in Nicaragua which were seen as being disruptive and belligerent.  But while neither party approved of 
American actions, neither were they truly opposed to the end goal of the United States, which was for 
Nicaragua to be governed by someone more sympathetic to Western business and financial interests. 
The government was quite happy to see Chamorro and the UNO triumph over Ortega and the FSLN in 
1990.  Neither the Liberals or the Tories really wanted the Sandinistas in power.  But the pressure 
placed on them by the Canadian people, in combination with Canada's interests on the international 
stage, made it impossible for them not to be at least nominally supportive of the Sandinistas and push 
for a negotiated, peaceful solution to the problems in the region.
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